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ABSTRACT—This Article calls into question the fundamental premises of 
models of judicial decisionmaking utilized by legal and political science 
scholars. In the place of the predominant theories, I offer a new approach to 
understanding judicial behavior which recognizes judicial heterogeneity, 
multidimensional behavior, and interconnectedness among judges at 
different levels within the judiciary. The study utilizes a unique dataset of 
over 30,000 judicial votes from eleven courts of appeals in 2008, yielding 
statistically independent measures for judicial activism, ideology, 
independence, and partisanship. Based upon those four metrics, statistical 
cluster analysis is used to identify nine statistically distinct judging styles: 
Trailblazing, Consensus Building, Stalwart, Regulating, Steadfast, 
Collegial, Incrementalist, Minimalist, and Error Correcting. These judicial 
style types offer a fuller account of judicial behavior than any of the prior 
models utilized by scholars. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2011, a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel issued an 
eagerly awaited decision in a case concerning the constitutionality of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 In a split vote among 
the three jurists, Judges Boyce Martin and Jeffrey Sutton held that the ACA 
was constitutional under existing precedent related to the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses.2 Scholars, pundits, and other court watchers 
were shocked at Judge Sutton’s vote to uphold the “liberal” law because he 
was known as a prominent conservative judge appointed by a Republican 
President.3 As Professor Arthur Hellman stated after the panel’s decision: 
 
1 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).  
2 Id. at 534, 541; id. at 554–55, 558 (Sutton, J., concurring in part). 
3 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Appeals Court Upholds Insurance Mandate, USA TODAY, June 30, 
2011, at 7A (“Sutton’s stance was also important because he is one of the most high-profile 
conservative judges nationwide.”); Robyn Blumner, A Vote for Upholding Health Reform, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 17, 2011, at 5P (“You may not have heard of Sutton, but he’s a fixture in 
conservative legal circles. Sutton clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. As a lawyer, 
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“Of all the federal appeals judges, Sutton is one of the last I would have 
expected to uphold this.”4 
Just as the qualitative impressions of Judge Sutton led commentators 
astray, the three dominant quantitative models of judicial decisionmaking 
failed to predict his vote.5 The attitudinal model, which contends that 
political ideology guides judicial votes, could not rationalize the “liberal” 
vote from a “conservative” judge, regardless of how ideology is measured.6 
The strategic model, which holds that judges issue opinions based upon 
institutional and personal considerations, was similarly stifled, as Judge 
Sutton had seemingly sacrificed his chance of being nominated to the 
Supreme Court by a Republican President.7 And the formal model, which 
argues that neutral judges render decisions by determinate rules, could not 
easily explain why the three judges had not reached the same conclusion 
 
he was an active member of the Federalist Society and a persistent advocate for states’ rights before the 
U.S. Supreme Court. After Sutton was nominated to the federal appellate bench by President George W. 
Bush, he won only two Democratic votes in his Senate confirmation. Yet Sutton, in a stroke of 
uncompromising objectivity, became the first judge appointed by a Republican President to rule in 
favor of the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.”); Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court 
Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 13, 2011, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/07/13/a-supreme-court-scorecard/ (“It would be inaccurate to say that Judge Sutton is a rising star 
in the conservative legal firmament; the 50-year-old former law clerk to Justice Scalia and the late 
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. is fully risen, on anyone’s short list for the next time a Republican president 
gets the chance to make a Supreme Court nomination.”); Dan Horn, Cincinnati Appeals Court Upholds 
Obama’s Health-Reform Plan, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (June 29, 2011), http://news.cincinnati.com/
article/20110629/NEWS0108/306290041/Cincinnati-appeals-court-upholds-Obama-s-health-reform-
plan (“Sutton’s decision to join Martin in the majority was to some observers the most surprising aspect 
of the ruling. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Sutton is among the most reliably conservative 
of the 6th Circuit’s 15 judges.”); Ilya Somin, Regulating Inactivity: A Radical Constitutional 
Departure, JURIST (July 1, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/07/ilya-somin-sixth-circuit-ruling.php 
(“Before this decision, judges in these cases had split along ideological and partisan lines. . . . Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton, however, a well-known conservative jurist, has now become the first exception to the 
trend.”). 
4 Horn, supra note 3. 
5 See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 
1457, 1461–90 (2003) [hereinafter Cross, Decisionmaking]. Cross also discussed a fourth model for 
judicial decisionmaking: the litigant-driven theory. Id. at 1490–97. However, the litigant-driven theory 
has not been widely studied, and as Cross noted, evidence that litigants drive decisionmaking in the 
courts of appeals has been very limited. Id. at 1514. 
6 Using as a simple proxy measure the party of the appointing President, Cross, Decisionmaking, 
supra note 5, at 1479, Judge Sutton scored as a 1, the same as every other judge appointed by a 
Republican President. Using the more refined Common Space Scores, see Lee Epstein et al., The 
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007), which incorporate Senatorial politics at the 
time of confirmation, Judge Sutton scored a 0.2260, which placed him as a moderate conservative. In 
neither instance did the traditional attitudinal model predict a liberal vote in a seemingly ideologically-
charged case from Judge Sutton. 
7 Greenhouse, supra note 3; Mark Walsh, Youth Will Out: No Matter Who Wins, Nominees Will 
Get Younger, 98 A.B.A. J. 19 (2012) (“The former Scalia clerk has been a darling of conservatives, but 
his concurring opinion last year upholding the Affordable Care Act has led some to cross Sutton off 
their [Supreme Court nominee] lists.”). 
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about the relevant precedent.8 Although ideology alone was successful in 
predicting the votes of all of the Supreme Court Justices except Chief 
Justice John Roberts in their review of the ACA,9 such a simple predictor 
has repeatedly failed to explain the overwhelming majority of votes by 
judges on lower federal courts.10 So, why were all of the empirical models 
“wrong” in predicting the Sixth Circuit’s decision?11 
The fault lies in the fact that the dominant models of judicial12 
decisionmaking rely on three basic dubious assumptions that have been 
neither empirically tested nor validated for lower court judges: 
1. Homogeneity—judges should be understood as a monolithic group 
that utilizes similar, if not identical, approaches to judging.13 
2. Unidimensionality—judges decide cases based upon [ideology, 
strategy, law] and [ideology, strategy, law] should be measured along 
a single continuum.14 
 
8 Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, 65 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 108 (2002) (“[T]he demands of public reasoning diverge from the legal model. 
In law, judges who have deliberated and yet continue to disagree form themselves into majorities, 
pluralities, concurrences, and dissents. In separate opinions, judges develop the divergent reasoning of 
their separate positions.”). This is not to say that the formal model predicts no dissents by judges. 
Rather, for judges below the Supreme Court, the formal model must necessarily integrate explanations 
from alternative theories to explain why judges disagree about the application of specific precedent. 
9 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
10 See, e.g., Cross, Decisionmaking, supra note 5, at 1479–82. 
11 “[W]rong” is used in the sense that Judge Sutton’s vote is not consistent with the expected results 
of the three dominant theories. Of course, no theory of judicial decisionmaking approaches 100% 
accuracy. The story of Judge Sutton’s vote is, thus, intended to illustrate the shortcomings of the 
dominant models, but not to provide a statistical proof of the failure of those theories. 
12 Although the introduction includes as examples the Justices of the Supreme Court, the words 
“judges” and “judicial” in this Article refer to judges other than the Justices. Although some of the 
criticisms of the dominant approaches in this Article apply to Supreme Court studies, far more research 
of the Court has been done that meets the challenges outlined in this Article. See Cross, 
Decisionmaking, supra note 5, at 1479–82. Indeed, in some cases, the excellent empirical research on 
the Justices has inspired some of the measures described and utilized in this Article. See, e.g., Andrew 
D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 139–40 (2002). 
13 See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1203 (2007) (“The jurisdictional competition model assumes that judges are 
homogeneous. Of course, they were not. Introducing heterogeneity would complicate the model without 
substantially altering the conclusions.”).  
14 This assumption has been most often made in studies of judicial ideology. See Carolyn Shapiro, 
Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
477, 501 (2009) (“These scholars assume that in deciding a case, the Justices need only consider their 
preferences about a single question and that the Justices’ preferences can be arrayed along a single 
ideological dimension.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although some scholarship has tested and 
validated the unidimensionality assumption at the Supreme Court level, see Tonja Jacobi & Matthew 
Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1, 
19–20 (2009) (“[T]here is considerable evidence that a single dimension captures the vast majority of 
judicial behavior. The fact that one dimension captures most judicial behavior does not imply that legal 
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3. Isolation—each judge or level of judges should be gauged 
independently of other actors in the judicial system.15 
Based upon those assumptions, existing research presumes that Judge 
Sutton would behave like every other judge based upon the single 
dimension of ideology, strategy, or law without any regard to the 
particulars of the district court judgment under review. These tenuous 
premises have been at the center of empirical research in large part because 
of the available data. There simply has not been a publicly accessible 
dataset that could be effectively used to study relationships between diverse 
judges while concurrently utilizing multiple behavioral metrics of 
individual judges.16 
This study, based upon a unique dataset of over 30,000 judicial votes, 
seeks to rectify the shortcomings of the previous attempts to empirically 
explain and predict judicial behavior with a new dataset that integrates both 
federal trial and appellate decisionmaking. In order to do so, I apply 
statistical cluster analysis to construct a typology of judicial styles based 
upon my prior work that created behavioral metrics of judicial activism, 
independence, partisanship, and ideology.17 This method yields nine 
distinctive judicial decisionmaking styles exhibited in the data by judges on 
the United States Courts of Appeals: 
 
analysis is simplistic, only that most judicial considerations are generally quite highly correlated.”), no 
similar studies have been done for the courts of appeals. See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, 
What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 152, 168–
70 (2009) (“At the same time, the assumption of unidimensional ideology may not hold as well for 
other courts as it does for the United States Supreme Court. Very little is known about the 
dimensionality of ideology on other courts, and further investigation is surely warranted.”).  
15 A notable exception to this general rule has been the work regarding panel effects. See, e.g., 
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–75 (1998); Pauline T. 
Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of 
Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1751–56 (1997). However, even within the very 
valuable scholarship regarding panel effects, research has been limited to judges operating on the same 
panels. Scholars have not explored the interrelations between judges working at different levels in the 
judicial system. This omission is particularly notable given the rigid hierarchal structure of the judicial 
systems in the United States wherein review of lower courts is the primary function of higher courts.  
16 Previous empirical research concerning federal appellate judges has relied primarily upon the 
United States Courts of Appeals Database (Songer Database), which includes more than 18,000 
opinions from 1925 to 1996. See ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14, 241 (2001). For reasons discussed later in this Article, the Songer 
Database cannot be used to test the three basic assumptions targeted herein. See infra Part I.A.  
17 Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the 
Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Yung, Activism]; Corey Rayburn Yung, 
Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133 (2010) [hereinafter Yung, Ideology]; Corey Rayburn Yung, 
Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and Independence in the Federal Courts, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505 (2012) [hereinafter Yung, Partisanship]. 
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 Trailblazing: shaping circuit law along ideological lines while 
being relatively unconcerned with the particulars of district 
court review; 
 Consensus Building: maintaining strong ideological 
commitments while effectively encouraging panel unanimity; 
 Stalwart: exhibiting the strongest partisan and ideological 
leanings; 
 Regulating: reversing and affirming district courts based upon 
ideological preferences at a higher rate while showing little 
ideological conflict on appellate panels; 
 Steadfast: acting as polarizing lightning rods to judges of all 
ideologies; 
 Collegial: strongly valuing norms of consensus with all other 
judges; 
 Incrementalist: exhibiting some ideological leanings, but 
having few battles with copanelists; 
 Minimalist: deciding in a manner highly deferential to district 
courts; and 
 Error Correcting: not acting ideologically or as a partisan 
toward district courts, but still showing little deference to 
those courts. 
This typological approach offers the most comprehensive explanation 
of judicial behavior based upon empirical data. The judicial style typology 
paints a fuller explanation of judicial behavior while not oversimplifying 
outcomes as being the sole products of ideology, strategy, or law. 
Returning to the example of Judge Sutton’s vote in the ACA case, the 
empirically based typology is entirely consistent with Judge Sutton’s 
decision to uphold the law. Judge Sutton is a Regulating Moderate judge18: 
he is not particularly concerned with the ideological direction of circuit law 
and is more focused on the specific issues in the district court opinions 
under review. His Ideology Score (-1.8 on a scale from -100 to 100) places 
him almost at the ideological center point (supporting the label 
“Moderate”), in contrast to popular perception. Notably, his Independence 
Score (65.1 on a scale from 0 to 100) indicates he is well above average in 
dissenting and concurring from judges of all political backgrounds, which 
fits well with his decision to write separately from both Judges Martin and 
Graham.19 Although no single case either proves or disproves a larger 
theory, it is worth noting that among the competing qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, only the model described in this Article is 
consistent with one of the highest profile decisions of a court of appeals 
panel in recent memory. Further, as discussed in Part III.D, the typology as 
 
18 See infra Part III.B and App. C. 
19 See infra App. B. 
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applied to other high-profile judges is highly consistent with conventional 
wisdom. 
After having identified the nine styles of judging and comparing those 
styles to qualitative assessments of those judges, this Article examines 
whether the judicial style types identified are correlated with background 
characteristics of the judges studied. A judge’s decisionmaking style is 
correlated with, among other factors, ranking of law school attended, 
whether a judge had taken senior status, and the appointing President’s 
political party. Of particular note, judges of the most contentious types 
(Steadfast, Stalwart, and Trailblazing) on average attended law schools 
ranked nearly thirty places higher than those judges associated with 
collaborative styles (Collegial and Consensus Building). Certain styles 
were also strongly associated with the party of the appointing President. 
Steadfast judges were much more likely to have been appointed by 
Democratic Presidents, whereas Incrementalist and Trailblazing judges 
were primarily appointed by Republicans. 
This Article is not designed to complete the project of identifying 
different styles of judging. Instead, it represents proof of concept. The 
methods and results described herein are meant to demonstrate new 
possibilities and directions in academic research about judicial behavior. 
Indeed, with more data, dimensions of behavior, and/or judges studied, I 
hope that the typology described in this Article is improved upon, revised, 
and ultimately replaced. 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses existing research and the 
dominant views pertaining to judicial decisionmaking, particularly for 
judges on the courts of appeals. Part II describes in detail the underlying 
study design, data, and four behavioral measures (activism, ideology, 
independence, and partisanship). Part III outlines the statistical process 
used to identify the differing judicial styles and discusses the salient traits 
of each type of judging style. Part IV analyzes background and 
demographic characteristics of individual judges to determine if they 
predict judge decisionmaking styles. Consistent with the goal of making 
empirical legal studies more accessible to a broader audience,20 this Article 
avoids empirical research jargon whenever possible and utilizes graphical 
representations.21 However, the statistical information traditionally found in 
empirical legal studies is located in the footnotes and appendices at the end 
of this Article. 
 
20 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of 
the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2006); Fischman & Law, supra 
note 14, at 135–36.  
21 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective Communication of the 
Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801, 804–05 (2007). 
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I. UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
Judges have been objects of study for decades, but in recent years 
there has been an explosion of empirical research about how judges decide 
cases.22 In political science and law, scholars have placed a particular focus 
on the role of political ideology in shaping judicial decisions.23 The 
Supreme Court has been the primary judicial body studied,24 often to the 
neglect of courts that have a greater net impact on the development of 
American law.25 As Judge Richard Posner noted, “[T]he Supreme Court 
reviews only a minute percentage . . . of court of appeals decisions. Entire 
fields of law are left mainly to the courts of appeals to shape.”26 
Notably, scholars tend to assume that the theories and models of 
Supreme Court decisionmaking describe the behavior of judges in 
general.27 However, the modern Supreme Court has been atypical in many 
ways and studies have shown that what has held true for the Justices is 
largely inapplicable to lower courts like the federal courts of appeals.28 
With approximately seventy-five cases per year,29 the amount of law 
reviewed by the Supreme Court is very limited.30 Further, actions by 
Supreme Court Justices are essentially unconstrained;31 Justices are free to 
vote in any manner based on any rationale with limited repercussions for 
their career. When a person is appointed to the Court, she has life tenure 
with almost no possibility of impeachment based upon judicial 
 
22 Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Foreword, Measuring Judges and Justice, 
58 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1174 (2009); Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About 
Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1535 (2009); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment 
and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 
874 (2008).  
23 See Fischman & Law, supra note 14, at 168–70; Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and 
Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 744 
(2005). 
24 Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 621 (2000). 
25 See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005). 
26 Id. 
27 Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1665 (1998) (“The attitudinal and strategic theories of judicial behavior 
described above have been developed almost entirely through a consideration of the behavior of U.S. 
Supreme Court justices.”). 
28 See Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1049, 1054 (2006); Schauer, supra note 24.  
29 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (2007) [hereinafter 
CROSS, DECISION MAKING]. 
30 See id. 
31 See Posner, supra note 28. 
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performance32 and no realistic chance of promotion to incentivize, and 
therefore constrain, her behavior. In contrast, the court of appeals judges 
continue to review an enormous number of cases from varied areas of 
law;33 are constrained by the Supreme Court, en banc review, and other 
panel decisions;34 and can be evaluated based upon performance before 
potentially being elevated to the Supreme Court.35 Nonetheless, the major 
decisionmaking models used to describe lower court behavior have been 
largely transplanted from empirical research of the Supreme Court.36 
A. Law, Strategy, and Politics 
Three basic models define the debate regarding judicial 
decisionmaking among legal and political science scholars. The attitudinal 
model contends that judicial choices are best explained by ideology.37 The 
strategic model identifies institutional and personal incentives as the 
explanation for judicial behavior.38 The formal model views doctrine, 
precedent, and interpretation of codified law as central to decisions by 
judges.39 
The dominance of the attitudinal, strategic, and formal models of 
decisionmaking can best be understood through a brief history of their 
origins. Much of the modern empirical research about judges initially 
derived from political science models of legislatures.40 Such conceptions of 
 
32 See, e.g., Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to 
Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 
799, 800 (1986) (explaining that, under the Constitution, Justices enjoy life tenure and can only be 
removed by impeachment proceedings, and pointing out that no Justice has ever been successfully 
impeached). 
33 See CROSS, DECISION MAKING, supra note 29.  
34 See Posner, supra note 28; see also Charlie Savage, Uncertain Evidence for ‘Activist’ Label on 
Sotomayor, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A10 (“Supreme Court justices have a freer hand than appeals 
court judges.”). 
35 See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 299, 303 (2004). 
36 George, supra note 27. 
37 See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 6 (2002) (outlining the theory that judges make decisions based on 
policy preferences). 
38 Posner, supra note 28, at 1056 (suggesting that the desire to obtain celebrity, to wield power, or 
to “play the judicial game” drives judges to work hard). 
39 See generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009) 
(contending that the hidden deliberative process of judging belies a process with strong adherence to 
rules and laws); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1663–64 (2003) (“Institutional rules and norms motivate judges to behave in 
ways that further the institutional mission. They help to form judges’ motivations and influence how 
they do their job. . . . In my view, ‘institution’ broadly includes the rule of law, not just the court on 
which a judge sits, or local circuit precedent. . . . [M]ost fundamentally, we feel that we owe a duty to 
the law itself.”). 
40 Knight, supra note 22, at 1536. 
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decisionmaking relied on spatial models that sought to identify ideological 
distance among individual legislators.41 Early studies of the courts viewed 
judicial decisions as policy choices similar to those made by legislators.42 
Modern judicial decisionmaking research’s legislative roots helped spawn 
the attitudinal model.43 Proponents contrasted the attitudinal model with the 
formal model of law, which attitudinalists often constructed more as a 
straw man than an actual position taken by scholars.44 Modern adherents to 
the formal theory of decisionmaking do not argue that every case has been 
decided solely by mechanical application of the law, but contend that 
neutral judges resolve the large majority of legal disputes by determinate 
rules.45 The formalists cite the differences between the Supreme Court and 
other courts to explain the varying centrality of ideology in 
decisionmaking.46 
The strategic model addresses the personal and institutional goals of 
judges, which is missing from both the formal and attitudinal models. As 
Judge Posner explained: 
 Judges have a utility function, as economists refer to a person’s system of 
preferences, just like everybody else . . . . I think most judges (I have in mind 
particularly federal appellate judges, the slice of the judiciary that I know best) 
are guided in their judicial performance primarily by two objectives that are 
different from and more interesting than a desire for leisure or a thirst for 
celebrity. One is a desire to change the world for the better (which to the 
cynical is simply a desire to exercise power—and the ability to exercise even 
modest power is indeed a perk of being a judge). The other is to play the 
judicial game.47 
Generally, advocates of the strategic model have not embraced a 
strong version of the theory that incentives have dictated all judicial 
decisions. Instead, like those who have supported the attitudinal and formal 
models, they have made concessions to incorporate the other theories.48 
With the three global theories of decisionmaking in place, much recent 
scholarship in the area focuses on determining the degree to which each 
 
41 Id. (“The models were standard spatial models that sought to analyze legislative votes as a 
function of the ideological distance between a legislator’s ideal preference point and the utility point of 
the proposed piece of legislation under consideration.”). 
42 Id. at 1536–37 (“In these early studies judicial choices were operationalized, not as dispositional 
votes, but rather as measures of the substantive policy consequences of the decisions.”). 
43 See LENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 1946–1963, at 6 (1965); Knight, supra note 22, at 1536.  
44 See H. Jefferson Powell, A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right 
Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725 (2009). 
45 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 39, at 1897–98.  
46 See id. at 1897, 1904.  
47 Posner, supra note 28, at 1056.  
48 See id. at 1054–56. 
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theory explains portions of decisionmaking in different court settings.49 
Regarding the United States Courts of Appeals, Professor Frank Cross 
comprehensively treated the three theories and found some evidence to 
support the attitudinal model, more to indicate formal constraints on 
decisionmaking, and almost none to corroborate the strategic theory.50 
Because Cross’s study was the first to systematically assess the three 
models as applied to the courts of appeals,51 its value in this area has been 
substantial. In many ways, it was the pinnacle of what could be done with 
existing data and the three major models in studying federal appellate 
judges. 
However, the Cross study also illustrated how data and model 
limitations have fundamentally constrained the study of decisionmaking in 
the courts of appeals. Cross, like most every other researcher engaged in 
the comprehensive study of those courts, used the United States Courts of 
Appeals Database (Songer Database),52 which included more than 18,000 
opinions from 1925 to 1996.53 Because the database sampled from the full 
range of circuits during such a long time frame, it included just a handful of 
opinions from each circuit in a given year. As a result, it was virtually 
impossible to use the Songer Database for individualized assessments of 
judges in any given time frame. Further, although the coding was very 
extensive in some areas (such as case issues), it was not able to be utilized 
at all for the ideology, activism, independence, and partisanship metrics 
described in this Article because the data neither included information 
about the district court judge being reviewed by an appellate panel nor had 
adequate data for individual judges.54 While the Songer Database has been 
an extremely valuable resource, research based upon it epitomizes the 
homogeneity, unidimensionality, and isolation assumptions of judicial 
decisionmaking. 
More recently, perspectives from other fields have emerged and 
pushed the discussion beyond the three reigning models in scholarly 
debates.55 Judge Posner’s attempt to give readers a peek into judicial 
 
49 See, e.g., George, supra note 27, at 1640–41 (testing a combination of the attitudinal and 
strategic models in Fourth Circuit en banc cases).  
50 Cross, Decisionmaking, supra note 5, at 1514–15.  
51 Id. at 1461. 
52 Id. at 1498. 
53 KUERSTEN & SONGER, supra note 16. 
54 It is theoretically possible that the Songer Database would have allowed for the independence 
measure because independence is solely determined by dissents and concurrences on three-judge 
panels, but the passing of time and small sample sizes for judges with limited times on the bench would 
create problems for the reliability of any results. Although the Songer Database included a field for 
standard of review, which was essential to the measures in this Article, coding was limited to instances 
of agency review and not lower court review.  
55 See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 
(1998).  
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chambers in How Judges Think, which identified nine theories of 
decisionmaking from a range of academic disciplines, is particularly 
notable.56 In addition to the three major models, Posner discussed 
sociological, organizational, psychological, economic, pragmatist, and 
phenomenological theories.57 However, the additional theories investigated 
by Posner have not yet been subject to the rigor of empirical analysis at the 
level applied to the political science models.58 
B. Studies of Judicial Methods, Similarity, and Interrelations 
While the three leading models described above have predominated 
empirical research by political science and legal scholars, a separate strain 
of inquiry over the last thirty years has targeted the diversity of types of 
judges. In 1981, Professor J. Woodford Howard published a study based 
upon surveys of judges sitting on three federal courts of appeals.59 Howard 
identified three types of judges: (1) innovators who sought to inject new 
ideas into the law, (2) interpreters who believed that the role of the judge 
was limited to discerning meaning, and (3) realists who embraced portions 
of the other two theories.60 More recently, Professor David Klein’s survey 
of federal appellate judges acknowledged the diversity of approaches used, 
but did not construct a formal typology.61 By utilizing citations of circuit 
court opinions by the Supreme Court, Professors Jeffrey Berger and Tracey 
George found a particular type of “judicial entrepreneur” that seemingly 
sought greater notoriety from the Supreme Court at the federal appellate 
level.62 
Professors Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist recently summarized 
the prevailing research concerning diverse judging approaches, which has 
not been interwoven into most empirical research about how judges render 
decisions described in the previous section: 
 Judges are a diverse lot, like any group of humans. They value different 
things in the course of rendering their decisions. Some may be more 
ideological in their judgments. Some may be more traditionally legalistic in 
their decisionmaking. Others may be pragmatic. As the surveys show, 
different judges view their roles differently. Judges place different emphases 
 
56 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19–56 (2008).  
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY 
OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS (1981). 
60 Id. at 160–63.  
61 DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 21–27 (2002).  
62 Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A 
Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 7–8, 19–20 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789544.  
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on the tradeoff between their roles as “generators of precedents” and resolvers 
of disputes.63 
It is not at all revolutionary to recognize that judges from varied 
backgrounds, living in different geographic locations, nominated under 
distinct political conditions, and having a range of ideological and legal 
views, have different decisionmaking methodologies. However, empirical 
research of judicial decisionmaking has done little to build upon the 
recognized differences among individual judges. 
Similar to work that questions the homogeneity assumption, some 
efforts have been made to test the unidimensionality premise for Supreme 
Court Justices.64 Further, panel effects research has also been extremely 
valuable in breaking down the idea that judges are separate islands 
rendering independent decisions.65 However, such research has yet to 
incorporate multiple levels of the judiciary and has only examined the 
interrelations between judges on three-judge panels.66 The study described 
in this Article attempts to expand upon the work of scholars that have 
recognized judicial heterogeneity, multidimensionality, and 
interconnectedness. In order to do so, I created four separate measures of 
federal appellate judge behavior for judges on the courts of appeals. 
II. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES 
The primary method of measuring traits of the federal appellate judges 
has been the use of static proxy techniques. For example, studies of judicial 
ideology have most commonly used the appointing President’s political 
party as a proxy for the judge’s ideology.67 Utilizing such a measure treats 
all Republican and all Democratic appointees as identical, does not 
incorporate any decisions by the judges, and assumes a President makes 
appointments solely upon ideological concerns.68 There has been a growing 
call by some scholars to move from such static proxy measures of judges to 
metrics derived from the actual behavior of judges.69 This study answers 
that call by utilizing multiple behavioral metrics to form a typology of 
judicial styles. In order to move beyond traditional proxies of judicial traits 
 
63 Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1416 (2009). 
64 See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides into the Sunset, 
24 CONST. COMMENT. 199, 200 (2007) (“To account for and accommodate these alternative 
dimensions, our earlier research constructed a method for identifying the most powerful Justice without 
relying on the assumption of unidimensional policy preferences. Instead, earlier efforts focused on the 
unique policy coalitions formed by the Justices in non-unanimous cases.” (footnote omitted)). 
65 See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 15; Kim, supra note 15, at 1322; Revesz, supra note 15.  
66  See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 15; Kim, supra note 15, at 1322; Revesz, supra note 15. 
67 Fischman & Law, supra note 14, at 167–70.  
68 See id. at 170–71. 
69 Id. at 176–83.  
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and provide sufficient information about individual judges throughout the 
federal court system, a new dataset was essential. 
A. Data Gathering and Database Construction 
The underlying data outlined in this study have been used in related 
research,70 but several important changes have been made that are noted 
below. Data were gathered from published and unpublished 2008 opinions 
issued by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. The analyzed dataset 
(Case Database) from those circuits included over 10,000 panel decisions 
and, as a result, over 30,000 votes by judges sitting on the courts of 
appeals.71 The Case Database was created from searches of LexisNexis 
databases of the courts of appeals that included standard of review 
language72 and excluded immigration73 and habeas corpus74 cases, which 
contained unique standard of review issues. Among other variables, cases 
were coded for: judges on the panel, whether individual judges were sitting 
by designation, appellate disposition, appellant, appellee, type of case (e.g., 
criminal or environmental), prevailing party, circuit, district court judge, 
district court, whether the case involved review of an executive agency 
decision, and standard of review used. In analyzing each case, the vote of 
each judge on the panel was coded separately, and thus a dissent by a judge 
in a case was coded so that the dissenting judge had the opposite view and 
disposition as the panel majority. This allowed for each judge’s behavior to 
be studied independently and collectively. The more recent version of the 
dataset was recoded using off-the-shelf computer software75 and scripting 
 
70 See generally Yung, Activism, supra note 17 (using the earliest version of the data in this study 
to measure judicial activism); Yung, Ideology, supra note 17 (using the data to measure judicial 
ideology); Yung, Partisanship, supra note 17 (using the data to measure judicial partisanship and 
judicial independence).  
71 The normal assumption that there would be three judicial votes for each panel in the dataset 
slightly overestimates the number of actual votes. There were a few instances where only two judges 
issued an opinion due to a death or recusal of a panel member. There were also instances when a single 
judge would issue an order without sitting on a three-judge panel. 
72 For each of the courts of appeals databases in LexisNexis, the following search was executed and 
all of the results were downloaded and coded: “date aft 1/1/2008 and date bef 1/1/2009 and (“De Novo” 
or Clear! Erro! or (Arbitrar! w/3 Capricious!) or (Abus! w/3 Discretion) or “Substantial Evidence” or 
“Standard of Review”) and not immigration and not habeas.” 
73 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of 
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 474 (2006) (discussing how large portions of immigration 
case review—those by the Board of Immigration Appeals—are based upon a collateral review model, 
which “revise[s] the standard of review to require greater deference to an immigration judge’s findings 
of fact”).  
74 See Brandon Scott, When Child Abuse Becomes Child Homicide: The Case of Gilson v. Sirmons, 
34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 281, 293–94, 305 (2009) (discussing the “unique standard of review” in 
federal habeas cases due to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act). 
75 The software used was TextConverter 3, which is available at http://simx.com/. 
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in Visual Basic.76 The automated coding process searched for over 100 
relevant variables in the header fields and text of opinions. Human coding 
was used to supplement, quality check, and ensure reliability of the 
automated coding.77 
B. Decisionmaking Metrics 
Instead of merely focusing on ideology as the determining factor in 
judicial decisionmaking, I sought to understand and measure how judges 
vote along multiple dimensions. Because the decisionmaking measures 
described below have been expounded upon in prior scholarship,78 the 
discussion is limited to the necessary elements of each and the basic 
methodologies used for their computation. In some instances, notes about 
modifications to previously used methodologies have been included as 
 
76 In the prior studies, data coding was performed exclusively by law student research assistants 
and the Author. Due to inconsistencies among and within the courts of appeals in formatting opinions, 
automated coding was not foolproof. However, quality checking indicates that the automated coding for 
every variable in this study is superior to the human coding done in prior editions of the dataset. See 
Yung, Activism, supra note 17; Yung, Ideology, supra note 17; Yung, Partisanship, supra note 17. 
Because the prior human coding had already been performed for over 96% of the cases in the 
new dataset, the human and computer coding were integrated. In particular, because some circuits have 
not regularly or ever reported the identity of the district court judge whose judgment was reviewed, 
human coding was essential in that area. When there were discrepancies in coding between the two 
systems, I resolved the differences by using my judgment as to how the variable should be coded. Some 
changes in the coding, which may have accounted for some of the different scores used in this study, 
included: separating decisions to vacate, reverse, remand, and reverse in part; coding of concurrences; 
to the degree possible, determining which standard of review was actually applied when multiple 
standards were listed; correcting errors in the source data downloaded from LexisNexis; further quality 
checking; coding of the actual opinion writer (as opposed to merely including them in the majority); 
and removing votes recorded on the decision to not hear a case en banc.  
77 Reliability is the degree to which the measurement would yield the same results when applied by 
others. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 83 (2002). Because this 
study is the first to systematically identify judicial styles for judges on the courts of appeals, it is 
impossible to compare the results directly with other research. Instead, reliability can only be evaluated 
by the quality of the coding and analysis. Since this is not the first study using some version of this 
dataset, see Yung, Activism, supra note 17, at 25–26; Yung, Ideology, supra note 17, at 1155–57; Yung, 
Partisanship, supra note 17, at 522–24, some of the discussion here is abbreviated.  
Case data were downloaded from LexisNexis for each of the circuits studied, which provides a 
stable platform for replication by other researchers. Many of the variables were coded by computer 
software, which should provide a high level of consistency among studies. The remaining data were 
coded by law students and recent law school graduates. On both the computer and human coded 
variables, quality checking was performed by other student and graduate coders as well as the Author. 
A variety of checks were performed to ensure internal consistency of variables that were necessarily 
interconnected. For example, the party labels in the coding include “criminal defendant.” Such a party 
label precluded “civil plaintiff” or “civil defendant” from appearing in the outcome variable. Many 
cross-checks were employed to ensure quality and correct errors within the dataset. 
78 See generally Yung, Activism, supra note 17 (measuring judicial activism of judges); Yung, 
Ideology, supra note 17 (measuring ideology of judges); Yung, Partisanship, supra note 17 (measuring 
independence and partisanship of judges). 
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well. This research isolated and measured four dimensions: activism, 
ideology, independence, and partisanship. 
1. Activism.—One of the most commonly used words to describe 
judicial behavior in public discourse is “activism.”79 A judge has been 
thought to exhibit activist traits if he fails to defer when expected.80 In the 
aggregate, a more activist judge will more often place his views above 
legislatures, executive branches, and other judges.81 When viewed in this 
way, activism can be thought of as a morally neutral concept.82 Activism is 
something in which all judges engage—it is just a question of degree. The 
measurement of activism described below is designed as a relative 
assessment of how likely a judge is to defer compared to other judges 
studied. 
The precise definition used for this empirical study was: 
Activism occurs when judges do not defer to constitutionally significant actors 
when a formal model of legal decisionmaking would predict otherwise.83 
Although it has been generally difficult to reach anything approaching 
consensus on what a formal model of law would predict, analysis of 
standards of review in the courts of appeals provides an effective baseline.84 
Standards of review have been used by federal appellate courts to indicate 
when they should defer to lower court judgments and when no deference is 
required.85 A judge who has regularly discounted deferential standards of 
review by reversing lower court judgments can be said to be more activist 
in the aggregate than a judge who has reversed less often in such situations. 
To remove ideological differences and other strategic motivations 
from the concept of activism, it was necessary to compare a judge’s 
behavior when using deferential and nondeferential standards of review. 
When applying a de novo (nondeferential) standard, judges were expected 
to reveal their true preferences. In contrast, it was expected that those 
preferences would be suspended from time to time when applying a 
deferential standard. Based upon those premises, the basic measurement for 
activism used in this study was: 
 
79 Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1442–44 (2004). 
80 See Yung, Activism, supra note 17, at 9. 
81 Id. 
82 See Robert Justin Lipkin, We Are All Judicial Activists Now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 203 (2008); 
Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (2002). 
83 See Yung, Activism, supra note 17, at 19. 
84 For a discussion of the general neglect of baselines in empirical legal research and the problems 
it has created, see generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Devising Rule of Law Baselines: The Next Step in 
Quantitative Studies of Judging (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law, Faculty Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 10-02-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547981.  
85 See Cross, Decisionmaking, supra note 5, at 1502–03.  
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Raw Activism Differential = Reversal rate using deferential standard – 
Reversal rate using de novo standard86 
Thus, judges with a higher Raw Activism Differential exhibited 
greater activism because they reversed lower court decisions using a 
deferential standard more often relative to unconstrained situations. The 
Raw Activism Differential was adjusted to reflect the particular circuit on 
which a judge sat, the mix of case issues each judge had, any “super-panel” 
effects87 that might have been experienced by the judge, and scaling to a 
common system. Greater detail about these adjustments can be found in 
Appendix A.88 
2. Ideology.—Scholars seeking to measure, explain, and predict 
judicial behavior primarily target judicial ideology.89 Although there has 
been some variation in definitions of ideology,90 substantially less 
controversy surrounds the concept of ideology than activism. The very 
basic definition used in this study was: 
Judicial ideology is the set of political beliefs that guide judicial decisions in 
some cases.91 
This study utilized what has become known as an agnostic measure.92 
Such measures rely on the idea that those who have similar ideologies will 
vote together more often and those who have dissimilar ideologies will 
disagree more often. With enough data, a researcher could identify groups 
with similar ideologies. And with some prior assessments about who is 
more likely to be conservative and liberal, researchers can apply agnostic 
scoring systems. Agnostic measures have the advantage over other 
behavioral techniques because they can be applied to large populations of 
data far more easily. A researcher could merely identify the disposition of 
an appellate panel’s judgment (e.g., affirmed, reversed, etc.) and any voting 
blocs among the panelists. However, almost 98% of panels in the courts of 
appeals in recent years have voted unanimously, which, because of the lack 
of observable differences, has prevented the use of agnostic measures 
entirely for those courts. 
Including the district court judge in the super-panel of judges produced 
greater information and resolved the unanimity problem. Reversals of 
 
86 See generally Yung, Activism, supra note 17, at 22. 
87 A super-panel is comprised of “the three appellate judges and the district judge whose decision is 
being reviewed.” See Yung, Partisanship, supra note 17, at 553–54.  
88 The mean Activism Score was 51.3, and the standard deviation was 16.7. The data were scaled 
linearly where a 0 score corresponded with a -32.4% adjusted Raw Activism Differential and a 100 
score indicated a +23.2% adjusted Raw Activism Differential. 
89 See Fischman & Law, supra note 14, at 135.  
90 Id. at 135, 137.  
91 See Yung, Ideology, supra note 17, at 1140. 
92 Fischman & Law, supra note 14, at 162–65.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1774 
district court judgments have been far more common than dissents on 
appellate panels. As a result, integrating disagreements between appellate 
judges and district court judges gave the study more points of comparison 
for the creation of an accurate ideology scoring system. When a judge on a 
federal appellate court reviewed the judgment of a district court judge, the 
appellate judge had three interactions that could yield information about the 
appellate judge’s ideology (two interactions with copanelists and one with 
the district judge). Using this agnostic coding system, the basic 
measurement of a judge’s ideology was: 
Raw Ideology Score = Rate of Agreement with Judges Appointed by 
Republican Presidents – Rate of Agreement with Judges Appointed by 
Democratic Presidents93 
A judge with a lower Raw Ideology Score was more liberal than a 
judge with a higher Raw Ideology Score (matching the traditional left-to-
right spectrum). Numerous adjustments were made to the Raw Ideology 
Score to provide a valid measure. Most significantly, because the district 
judge occupied a different role than copanelists, the rate of agreement with 
the district judge was measured separately. As a result, agreements with the 
district judge in the form of affirmances were adjusted by standard of 
review used and type of case (criminal or civil). A Raw Ideology Score was 
then computed for both the panel and district judge interactions. Those 
scores were combined based upon the rate of disagreement at each level 
and further adjusted to include specific circuit adjustments, further case-
issue-mix adjustments, any super-panel effects experienced by the judge, 
and scaling to a common system. These later adjustments are described in 
greater detail in Appendix A.94 
3. Independence.—Independent judges are thought to be more likely 
to “stick to their guns” and less likely to reach compromises with other 
judges.95 Notably, like activism and ideology, independence was not a 
positive or negative quality for a judge—it was simply another trait that 
 
93 See Yung, Ideology, supra note 17, at 1169–70. 
94 The mean Ideology Score was 2.9, and the standard deviation was 20.9. The data were linearly 
scaled where a -100 corresponded with a -21.4% adjusted Raw Ideology Score and a 100 indicated a 
15.5% adjusted Raw Ideology Score. 
95 Recent studies have identified independence as a characteristic of judicial behavior worthy of 
empirical investigation. See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Essay, A Tournament of Judges?, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 299, 310 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati Essay]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 23, 61 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the 
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 38 (2005). The study described in this Article conceived of 
and measured independence in a similar, but distinguishable manner from prior attempts. Unlike prior 
research, this study recognized that when other judges dissented from or concurred with a studied judge, 
that action was also an indicator of the studied judge’s independence. After all, the difference between 
dissenting and being dissented against is simply how the third judge on the panel voted.  
107:1757 (2013) A Typology of Judging Styles 
1775 
described tendencies in behavior. This basic definition of judicial 
independence was used: 
A more independent judge is one that is more apt to provoke minor and major 
disagreements with other judges beyond what ideological differences would 
predict.96 
Two types of disagreements were incorporated in the measurement: 
concurrences and dissents. In both situations, a judge presumably writes 
separately because she cannot find common ground with other written 
opinions. 
The following formula was used to determine the Raw Independence 
Score: 
Raw Independence Score = Rate of Dissents (including copanelist dissents) + 
Rate of Concurrences (including copanelist concurrences) – Expected Rate of 
Dissents (including copanelist dissents) – Expected Rate of Concurrences 
(including copanelist concurrences)97 
To remove disagreements based upon ideological differences, it was 
necessary to determine the rate at which ideological variance accounted for 
concurrences and dissents so that the Raw Independence Score could be 
untangled from the Raw Ideology Score (yielding expected rates of dissent 
and concurrence). The projected dissent and concurrence rates for each 
judge were computed based upon the degree to which a judge’s Raw 
Ideology Score differed from the mean of the circuit on which the judge 
was appointed. The projected disagreement rates were subtracted from the 
observed rates. Three additional adjustments were made to the Raw 
Independence Scores. The values were adjusted so that each judge’s scores 
were based upon average criminal and civil case mixes, placed on a 
logarithmic scale (to create a normal distribution), and scaled to a common 
system.98 The case mix and common scaling adjustments are further 
explained in Appendix A.99 
4. Partisanship.—In the few instances where scholars have referred 
to partisanship in empirical research, they have not considered it separately 
from ideology and activism.100 Normally, researchers have considered 
partisanship a negative attribute indicating ideological decisionmaking.101 
 
96 Yung, Partisanship, supra note 17, at 517.  
97 See id. at 518. 
98 Because of limited instances of judges issuing concurrences or dissents when traveling to other 
circuits, a separate circuit adjustment was not performed for the Independence Scores. 
99 The mean Independence Score was 44.1, and the standard deviation was 15.3. The data were 
logarithmically scaled, but before scaling a 0 corresponded with a -10.0% adjusted Raw Independence 
Score and a 100 indicated a 24.9% adjusted Raw Independence Score. 
100 See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 15. 
101 See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, 
Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 817 (2010).  
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Despite that shortcoming, “partisanship” and its opposite “indifference” 
were chosen because they best reflected the behavior being studied. 
Partisanship, unlike ideology, focuses more on party loyalty than 
ideological outcomes of cases. As with the other measures, the goal of this 
study was to treat partisanship as morally neutral behavior exhibited by 
judges on a relative scale. 
The basic definition of partisan behavior used in the study was: 
A judge is acting in a more partisan manner when he or she applies a neutral 
legal rule in a manner that demonstrates greater deference to members of a 
particular political party.102 
Notably, partisanship does not require conscious thought by a judge. It 
is simply a measure of whether a judge is more apt to defer to those of the 
same appointing party, whether the judge is aware of it or not. Like the 
Raw Activism Score, the Raw Partisanship Score focused on the standard 
of review as the baseline for identifying partisan behavior. If a judge 
deferred more often to a district judge appointed by the same political 
party, she was more partisan than a judge who deferred at the same rate to 
judges appointed by either party. And similar to the Raw Activism Score, 
the partisanship measure was focused exclusively on appellate and district 
court interactions. The following formula provided the Raw Partisanship 
Score: 
Raw Partisanship Score = (Deferential Reversal Rate of Democratic District 
Judges – Deferential Reversal Rate of Republican District Judges) – 
(Nondeferential Reversal Rate of Democratic District Judges – Nondeferential 
Reversal Rate of Republican District Judges)103 
Several adjustments were made to the Raw Partisanship Score. The 
one unique alteration was related to the inclusion of the appointing party of 
the court of appeals judge so that a Democratic appellate judge who 
favored Republican district judges (not partisan) would be scored 
differently than a Democratic appellate judge who favored Democratic 
district judges (partisan). The Raw Partisanship Score was adjusted to 
reflect the particular circuit on which a judge sat, the mix of case issues 
each judge had, any super-panel effects that might have been experienced 
by the judge, and then scaled to a common system. Greater detail about 
these adjustments can be found in Appendix A.104 
5. Differences Among Scores.—There was some concern that there 
would be overlap between the Ideology, Activism, and Partisanship Scores 
 
102 Yung, Partisanship, supra note 17, at 519.  
103 Id. at 521.  
104 The mean Partisanship Score was 44.8, and the standard deviation was 15.3. The data were 
linearly scaled—a 0 corresponded with a -73.7% adjusted Raw Partisanship Score, and a 100 indicated 
an 89.8% adjusted Raw Partisanship Score. 
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if they measured similar, related behavior, especially because the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably. As a result, I tested the three Scores, 
which some might believe to be too intertwined to provide separate 
dimensions of study, to determine statistical relationships. Notably, there 
were identified judges of all combinations of high and low Partisanship, 
Activism, and Ideology Scores. For example, then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor 
had a moderate Ideology Score (17.3), a low Activism Score (39.3), and a 
Partisanship Score nearly one standard deviation above the mean (57.2). 
Further, based upon robust linear regression, the Activism, Partisanship, 
and Ideology Scores were not correlated in a statistically significant 
manner.105 The data indicates that the Partisanship, Ideology, and Activism 
Scores describe separate behavior. 
6. Selection Effects.—There is an inherent concern in studying 
federal courts that the measures used might be the product of selection 
effects and, thus, not really indicative of the concept measured.106 A 
 
105 For Activism and Ideology Scores, p = 0.6530; Activism and Partisanship Scores, p = 0.1754; 
Ideology and Partisanship Scores, p = 0.4057. Robust regressions were also done to compare the 
Ideological Scores (absolute value of the Ideology Scores) with the Partisanship Scores. For Activism 
and Ideological Scores, p = 0.7443; Partisanship and Ideological Scores, p = 0.8418. 
106 See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 187, 204 (1993); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 55 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An 
Empirical Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 271. The classic model of selection effects relies on 
the incentives of litigants. The Priest–Klein hypothesis predicts that if parties have perfect information, 
case outcomes should split evenly between affirmances and reversals, since the parties would settle as 
needed to avoid other outcomes. See Priest & Klein, supra, at 4–5. Numerous studies have examined 
whether empirical evidence supports the Priest–Klein hypothesis. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, 
Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
337, 337–40 (1990); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: 
An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 590–91 (2001); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection 
Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 222–26 
(1995). The study described in this Article, consistent with prior examinations, provides ample reason 
to doubt the simple Priest–Klein hypothesis because the rate of affirmances is far higher than 50%, 
regardless of the standard of review used, in civil and criminal cases. Notably, the Priest–Klein model 
was limited to civil cases because the plea bargaining settlement structure in criminal cases creates 
radically different incentives, such that nothing close to a 50% affirmance rate results. See Priest & 
Klein, supra, at 46.  
However, at the federal appellate level, the cost of an appeal is very little compared to that of a 
trial. See Meehan Rasch, Not Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in Determining Frivolous 
Appeals Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, 62 ARK. L. REV. 249, 264 (2009). This means 
that the chance of settlement before the appeal is considered to be quite low. Uncertainty about 
appellate outcomes also creates an environment where parties cannot reach agreement about the 
potential risks and costs. The legal issues are usually close in civil cases, Brian Z. Tamanaha, The 
Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 748 (2009) (“As the authors 
acknowledge, the subset of cases that are actually appealed following trial are more likely to have ‘a 
degree of indeterminacy in the law.’” (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 16 n.20 (2006))), and the parties do not know which 
judges will decide the appellate case until right before oral argument, Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and 
Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically 
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selection effect occurs when a party other than the one being studied (e.g., 
a litigant) makes a decision (e.g., settlement) that is not accounted for by 
the study methods but should be.107 There were various moments when a 
selection effect could have occurred in the data that would create problems 
for the four behavior scores, including: prefiling, pretrial, during trial, pre-
verdict, post-verdict, pre-appeal, during appeal, and post-appeal. These 
selection effects could distort the four behavioral measures if they intersect 
with a factor important to the party triggering the effect. 
However, the significance of selection effects in this study is more 
limited than other analyses of the courts of appeals because the underlying 
measures used to create the judicial typology are all relative in nature. They 
do not attempt to state that a judge is, for example, “liberal” by some 
external objective scale. Instead, the judicial type model merely states that 
relative to the other judges studied, one is, for example, more steadfast in 
her approach. Therefore, as long as judges have similar selection effects or 
the study accounts for uneven selection effects in some way, the selection 
effects should not limit the inferences drawn from the study. 
Further, the typology ultimately accounted for the differing selection 
effects in criminal and civil cases by adjusting individual judge scores to 
assume each judge had the average proportion of criminal and civil cases. 
Beyond that, it is unclear if there are any uneven selection effects among 
the judge population. To the degree that the parties know the substantive 
and procedural law of a circuit and make the same basic risk assessments, 
which is what a selection effects model would generally predict, one would 
expect that regardless of differences among the circuits and judges the 
projected odds in individual cases would be similar. As a result, selection 
effects should be largely the same across the body of cases reviewed by 
judges in this study. And the behavioral measures should, thus, not be 
distorted by such effects. Nonetheless, because selection effects inherently 
limit such studies, it is worth noting that it is difficult to discern if such 
effects had a prominent role in shaping the data and results of this study. 
III. JUDICIAL STYLE TYPOLOGY 
Richard Eberhart once stated that “[s]tyle is the perfection of a point of 
view.”108 That is, the manner in which someone acts or presents herself 
reveals her perspective on the world. “Style” might seem an odd word to 
apply to what judges do because it lacks the grandiosity of “philosophy” 
and seriousness of “methodology.” However, because this study focuses on 
 
Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 688 (2000). By that time, the briefing has been completed, id., 
settlement is unrealistic, and the marginal cost of oral argument is low. 
107 See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the 
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 n.55 (1990) (“A selection effect may be 
defined as a causal relationship between the distribution of disputes and other variables of litigation.”).  
108 RICHARD EBERHART, THE QUARRY 111 (1964). 
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measuring the behavior of judges as manifested in outputs (judicial 
opinions and votes), it is the appropriate label to use. Judges might have 
had elaborate decisionmaking methods and/or committed judicial 
philosophies, but that does not mean they consistently exhibit such 
perspectives in opinions and votes. This could occur for several reasons. 
Judges may not practice what they preach. Their decisionmaking technique 
might only be applicable in some cases. Or, the methods or philosophy 
might point in conflicting directions. Further, there have been just a handful 
of judges with public records about their philosophies or methodologies 
from which any information could reliably and validly be inferred. 
In contrast, the concept of a judicial style focuses exclusively on the 
outward appearances of judicial decisionmaking. No references to or 
inferences about the decisionmaking process are made by the label “style.” 
Instead, the term stays true to the study methodology, which only considers 
the end result of the decisionmaking process and does not attempt to 
determine how such decisions were reached beyond the opinions published. 
As a result, individual judges may be wholly unaware of their style and 
disagree with the label applied in this study. Nonetheless, the data 
ultimately support the application of the particular style type to those 
judges. 
A. Multidimensional Clusters of Judges 
To construct a viable typology of judges, the 178 studied judges with 
adequate data needed to be sorted into groups based upon common traits.109 
This grouping was done with cluster analysis, a data analysis tool that 
categorizes data from one variable based upon similarities and differences 
across a set of other variables.110 I used Ward cluster analysis,111 which 
focuses on minimizing the variance of placing a judge in one group as 
opposed to another.112 In this case, judges were grouped according to their 
Activism, Ideological, Independence, and Partisanship Scores. Judges were 
grouped based on the absolute values of the Ideology Scores, such that a 
judge with a -60 score would be treated the same as one with a 60 score, to 
find commonalities in judicial style among persons on opposite ends of the 
 
109 Judges had to have at least 200 total interactions with other judges to be included in the study.  
110 See generally BRIAN S. EVERITT, SABINE LANDAU, MORVEN LEESE & DANIEL STAHL, CLUSTER 
ANALYSIS 13 (5th ed. 2011); Cross & Lindquist, supra note 63, at 1425 (“Cluster analysis is a statistical 
tool that enables like items to be grouped based on similarities and dissimilarities across a set of 
variables. . . . The procedure identifies the cases (individual judges) who share similarities with respect 
to certain variables . . . and groups them into categories, creating a sort of taxonomy of judges.”).  
111 For a prior example of the use of Ward cluster analysis in a judicial decisionmaking study, see 
Cross & Lindquist, supra note 63, at 1425–29. Ward cluster analysis in this Article was performed 
using the software Stata.  
112 See generally H. CHARLES ROMESBURG, CLUSTER ANALYSIS FOR RESEARCHERS 129–35 
(2004). 
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ideological spectrum. All four scores were on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 
indicating the highest level of that trait within the 178 judges. 
Because the clusters are formed along four separate dimensions, it is 
impossible to include a visual depiction of the shapes that enveloped the 
various clusters in a two-dimensional medium such as this Article. 
However, the commonalities among judges within each group can be seen 
in Appendix B where all of the judge scores are listed. 
To decide if a particular cluster was indeed a distinctive group and not 
merely statistically insignificant fluctuation in data values, I applied a basic 
standard deviation test: each identified cluster’s average scores had to 
deviate from every other cluster in at least one of the four behavioral scores 
by a standard deviation. Ultimately, using this technique, the data revealed 
nine separate judging style clusters. Figure 1 below indicates the number of 
average scores (Activism, Ideology, Independence, and Partisanship) that 
each cluster differed by at least one standard deviation from every other 
cluster. For example, Cluster 3 differed from Cluster 5 by a standard 
deviation in all 4 categories as can be seen looking at where the two 
clusters meet in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLUSTERS  
(NUMBER OF SCORES DIFFERENT BY AT LEAST ONE STANDARD DEVIATION) 
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 — 1 4 3 3 3 3 1 3 
2 1 — 3 4 3 2 1 3 3 
3 4 3 — 3 4 3 3 4 3 
4 3 4 3 — 2 2 1 2 3 
5 3 3 4 2 — 2 3 2 1 
6 3 2 3 2 2 — 1 1 1 
7 3 1 3 1 3 1 — 2 1 
8 1 3 4 2 2 1 2 — 1 
9 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 — 
 
These groups were then labeled according to the traits exhibited by 
their mean average scores. The nine identified judicial types are: 
Trailblazing, Consensus Building, Stalwart, Regulating, Steadfast, 
Collegial, Incrementalist, Minimalist, and Error Correcting.113 Individual 
judges in each group might have scores that deviate by a reasonable margin 
from the category mean scores, but the cluster analysis technique placed 
them in the appropriate group to minimize variation as compared to placing 
 
113 These names were chosen to embody the characteristics of the four measures of each type. 
Further, my goal was not to make value judgments about particular types of judges. As a result, I tried 
to use positive-sounding words for each type even when the labels used are not typically applied to 
judges. 
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that judge in an alternate group. Notably, as illustrated in Figure 2 below, 
the distribution among the judge style types was far from even. 
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES AMONG STYLE CATEGORIES 
 
 
Each of the nine judging styles and the quantitative aspects that define each 
type are discussed in more detail below. 
B. Judicial Styles 
Among the nine judicial style types, some groups have greater 
similarities than others. When possible, the critical differences among 
relatively similar groups are explained below. Further, the order of the 
styles discussed below was the one created by the statistical cluster 
analysis. Thus, to a degree the consecutive categories often, but not always, 
have commonalities. The descriptions are at times intentionally sparse in 
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FIGURE 3: AVERAGE TRAILBLAZING JUDGE SCORES 
 
Trailblazers are primarily in the business of carving out ideological 
decisions that shape circuit law and invite opposition by copanelists. Yet, 
review of district courts is less significant to these judges. As exhibited in 
Figure 3, Trailblazers exhibit high Ideological Scores (usually over two 
standard deviations from zero), high Independence Scores, low Activism 
Scores, and low Partisanship Scores. They have the second highest 
Ideological Scores of any group, but, contrary to the attitudinal model,114 
their behavior is less partisan and activist toward the district courts than the 
average judge. 
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FIGURE 4: AVERAGE CONSENSUS BUILDING JUDGE SCORES 
 
Consensus Builders are judges with strong ideological commitments 
who manage to encourage unanimity among appellate panelists with little 
partisan or activist review of the district courts. Figure 4 indicates that 
Consensus Builders, like Trailblazers, have very high Ideological Scores. 
Yet, again contrasting with the attitudinal model, which predicts 
ideological differences will cause voting differences,115 they have the 
lowest Independence Scores and typically below-average Activism and 
Partisanship Scores. That this group maintains strong ideology while 
inviting the least disagreement among the appellate judges indicates that 
they might be better at building voting blocs among ideologically diverse 
judges. 
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FIGURE 5: AVERAGE STALWART JUDGE SCORES 
 
Stalwart judges are the ideological and partisan leaders who take an 
active role in shaping circuit law and reviewing district court judgments. 
Stalwart judges had the highest Ideological, Activism, and Partisanship 
Scores of any judge type, as demonstrated in Figure 5. Interestingly, 
though, their Independence Scores were usually below the mean. Stalwarts 
were heavily involved in the review of district court judgments in a manner 
indicating a partisan bent. Yet, despite the clearest ideological 
decisionmaking of any judge type, they did not draw dissents and 
concurrences at rates expected by such strong ideological views. Stalwarts 
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FIGURE 6: AVERAGE REGULATING JUDGE SCORES 
 
Regulating judges are focused on reviewing district court judges in a 
more partisan manner than the average judge. Regulating judges, as 
illustrated in Figure 6, typically have Activism, Partisanship, and 
Independence Scores above the mean, and average Ideological Scores. The 
Partisanship Scores are usually the highest rating for such judges. This 
means that Regulating judges are typically more likely to use partisan 
criteria to reverse the judgments of district court judges in situations where 
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FIGURE 7: AVERAGE STEADFAST JUDGE SCORES 
 
Steadfast judges might be thought of as the lightning rods of the 
federal appellate courts because they are more likely to disagree with or 
invite disagreement by other judges (including district judges). Yet, 
surprisingly, there is no indication that such judges did so in a particularly 
ideological manner or that ideology is the source of disagreement with 
other judges. The judges are Steadfast because their numerous 
disagreements apparently stem from other sources or are derived from 
limited willingness to compromise their points of view. As Figure 7 
indicates, Steadfast judges have the highest Independence Scores of any 
type, elevated Activism Scores, and Ideological and Partisanship Scores 
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FIGURE 8: AVERAGE COLLEGIAL JUDGE SCORES 
 
Collegial judges are those that exhibit the strongest adherence to the 
norm of consensus in the appellate courts.116 These judges, on average, 
exhibit scores below the mean in every category, as seen in Figure 8. And 
their regulation of the district courts is relatively modest. Because their 
overall profile might indicate a preference for less disagreement and 
conflict among federal judges, they represent ideal colleagues. This group 
includes the highest number of judges of any of the nine types. 
 
116 See generally Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Making Under a Norm of Consensus: A Structural 
Analysis of Three-Judge Panels (Jan. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912299 (contending that the high rate of unanimity at the federal 
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FIGURE 9: AVERAGE INCREMENTALIST JUDGE SCORES 
 
Incrementalist judges are those that do not often fight ideological 
conflicts at the appellate level, but do push the district courts in a slightly 
partisan direction. These judges, whose scores are in Figure 9, typically 
have elevated Partisanship Scores and Activism, Ideological, and 
Independence Scores that are slightly lower than or at the mean. 
Incrementalists are not true ideological or partisan moderates, but their 
overall profile indicates a relatively restrained stance in ideological 
disputes. Their lower Independence Scores indicate that they do not pursue 
conflict. Unlike Regulating judges, Incrementalist judges are not typically 
as partisan and are far less activist. Whatever goals (strategic, legal, or 
otherwise) these judges have, they apparently approach them from the 
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FIGURE 10: AVERAGE MINIMALIST JUDGE SCORES 
 
Judicial Minimalists are most deferential to the judgments of the 
district courts. Judicial minimalism is the one style discussed in this Article 
that has received significant theoretical attention by scholars.117 Although it 
has been taken to mean different things in varied contexts, the essential 
idea of minimalism is that judges act in a restrained manner.118 In this 
study, as demonstrated in Figure 10, such judges have the lowest Activism 
Scores, slightly higher Independence Scores, and close-to-average 
Ideological and Partisanship Scores. The behavior of Minimalists shows 
the strongest adherence to norms of deference in place of partisanship and 
ideology. Because most judges are far more aggressive in exercising 
judicial power, the Minimalists have higher Independence Scores, 
indicating a higher rate of disagreements in judicial perspectives with other 
judges at the appellate level. 
 
117 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
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FIGURE 11: AVERAGE ERROR CORRECTING JUDGE SCORES 
 
Error Correctors are judges who seem to be primarily concerned with 
fixing “wrong” decisions by the district court judges without a partisan or 
ideological bent. Figure 11 outlines the scores of Error Correctors, who 
exhibit higher levels of Activism than average, slightly lower Partisanship 
and Ideology levels, and Independence measures close to the mean. As a 
group, they are less likely to defer to district judges but generally more 
likely to apply deferential rules in a party-neutral manner. They are similar 
to Regulating judges, but are significantly less partisan in reviewing district 
court judges. 
The judicial types for each judge are listed in Appendix C at the 
conclusion of this Article. Discussions of the style types of high-profile 
judges are reviewed in Part III.B. However, before reviewing the 
application of the typology to individual judges, it is helpful to consider 
possible limitations to the judicial style typology and underlying data. 
C. Limitations 
There are several limitations to the inferences drawn in this Article. 
Notably, all of the data studied in this Article were from 2008 opinions. As 
a result, the labels given to judges in this Article are only representative of 
that one year. Studies in other areas have shown the potential for drift in 
judicial behavior over time, which is not accounted for by the limited time 
frame used here.119 Further, the population of 178 judges examined here 
may not be representative of judges from other time periods. The studied 
group was largely composed of nominees of Presidents Bill Clinton and 
 
119 See generally Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (finding ideological drifts among some Supreme 
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George W. Bush. And the nominees from older Presidents were not 
necessarily a representative sample of all nominees by those Presidents 
because retirements are not random events. Particularly in this era of 
enormous political fights about nominations to the courts of appeals, it is 
unclear if any results here can be generalized into eras when the 
nomination process was different. Lastly, even assuming that the nine 
identified styles account for the extent of modern judge types, there is no 
reason to believe that those styles encapsulate the possible approaches of 
judges used throughout time. 
D. Comparison to Public Accounts of Judges 
To determine if a measure is statistically valid, it needs to be evaluated 
against some other assessment.120 Because there is neither another judicial 
style typology nor a quantitative behavioral assessment of all of the 178 
judges studied, qualitative comparison was the only available means of 
evaluating the validity of the typology in assessing judicial behavior. 
However, there is limited public information about the large majority of the 
178 judges studied. As a result, only a high-profile subset of judges could 
be used to determine model validity. In the dataset, there are at least nine 
judges that might be deemed to have sufficient notoriety based upon media 
attention. The judges listed in Figure 12 either have “celebrity” status as 
public intellectuals or judicial lightning rods, have been mentioned as 
possible Supreme Court Justices, or, in the case of Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, have actually been appointed to the Supreme Court. Figure 12 
includes a list of those judges, their four component behavioral scores, and 
 
120 “A measure is facially valid if it is consistent with prior evidence, including all quantitative, 
qualitative, and even informal impressionistic evidence.” Epstein & King, supra note 77, at 89. Validity 
is determined by whether the measurements used in an empirical study reflect the concept(s) measured. 
Id. at 87. Lee Epstein and Gary King considered three possible ways to view validity: facial validity, 
unbiasedness, and efficiency. Id. at 89. Although establishing validity in each of those categories is not 
strictly required, id. (“[N]o one of these is always necessary, and together they are not always sufficient, 
even though together they are often helpful in understanding when a measure is more or less valid.”), 
this Article considers each type in turn. Because the validity of the four underlying judicial traits has 
been considered in prior scholarship, the validity discussion in this Article focuses solely on the nine 
judicial types. If there were validity problems with the underlying measures, however, those would 
certainly affect the validity of the results of this further study.  
The metric method is unbiased if it produces results that are consistent through repetitive 
analysis. Id. at 92. This is an area where the methodology of this study excels. Reliance on computer 
coding and quantitative analysis and the exclusion of judges with insufficient population sizes provides 
a stable, unbiased measurement methodology. There is some potential for bias in the decision as to the 
appropriate number of judicial types, but that is inevitable in the use of cluster analysis. The last validity 
concern is “to choose the [study design] with the minimum variance.” Id. at 95. Treating the judges 
studied in 2008 as the population instead of a sample of a larger body of cases diminishes the level of 
variance in the study. Further, the data were analyzed with frequentist statistics, which have no variance 
outside of a sampling structure.  
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their resultant judicial style type (including appointing President’s political 
party and ideological assessment based upon the Ideology Score): 
FIGURE 12: NOTABLE JUDGES 
Judge Ideo. Act. Part. Ind. Overall Type 





































Among these judges, many have a good impressionistic fit with their 
typology categorization. For example, Judge Danny Boggs, embodying the 
traits of a Trailblazing conservative, has been at the forefront of many of 
the judicial battles on the Sixth Circuit.121 As would be expected from a 
Trailblazing judge, he has had many contentious battles with his 
 
121 See David Hawpe, Clearing the Air on Sixth Circuit Judges’ Junkets and Jousts, COURIER-
JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2006, at H2; Adam Liptak, Order Lacking on a Court: U.S. Appellate Judges in 
Cincinnati Spar in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A10. 
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ideological opponents.122 Dissenting in a case concerning whether a stay of 
execution should be granted, Judge Boggs went so far as to write: “[A] 
majority of the active members of this court would grant a stay based on a 
hot dog menu.”123 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, an Incrementalist moderate Republican 
according to the typology, has long been recognized as a strong 
conservative voice on the Seventh Circuit.124 However, Judge Easterbrook 
has also been an open opponent of judicial activism, and the designation as 
an Incrementalist seems appropriate.125 Further, Judge Easterbrook’s 
reputation as a thoughtful intellectual is more consistent with a pragmatic, 
incremental approach than it is with a political warrior.126 
Judge Easterbrook’s conservative colleague, Judge Richard Posner, is 
certainly the most well-known court of appeals judge in America. The 
judicial typology categorizes Judge Posner in the same grouping as Judge 
Easterbrook, an Incrementalist moderate Republican. Despite their 
occasional publicized disagreements,127 both Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook are known as prominent conservative judges.128 The 
Incrementalist label might not fully capture Judge Posner’s idiosyncratic 
approach to judging, but it does seem similar to his self-described 
pragmatism, which rejects grand theories in favor of real-world 
reasonableness.129 
Judge Diane Wood is the third of the notable nine judges who is on the 
Seventh Circuit and is categorized as an Incrementalist liberal. That label 
coincides well with the media coverage at the time President Obama 
considered her for the Supreme Court.130 There is little dispute that Judge 
Wood is liberal.131 Judge Wood has embodied Incrementalist traits in 
regularly bridging the gap with conservative judges on the Seventh Circuit 
and gaining respect as a thoughtful, careful jurist.132 
Judge Michael McConnell was a law professor, served as a federal 
judge on the Tenth Circuit during the study period, and is now a law school 
professor once again. The typology categorizes Judge McConnell as a 
 
122 Hawpe, supra note 121; Liptak, supra note 121. 
123 In re John W. Byrd, Jr., 269 F.3d 578, 582 (6th Cir. 2001) (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
124 See James B. Stewart, In Obama’s Victory, a Loss for Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, at 
B1.  
125 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401, 1405, 1409–10 (2002). 
126 See A Good Decision on Motor Voter, WASH. POST, June 7, 1995, at A20. 
127 See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Blagojevich Jury Names Create Rift Among Judges, CHI. TRIB., July 
16, 2010, at C26. 
128 See Peter Slevin, Wood’s Critics Focus on Abortion, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, at A5.  
129 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59–60, 73 (2003). 
130 See, e.g., Cross-Court Shot, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Apr. 29, 2010, at A10. 
131 See Dana Milbank, Obama Picks a Nominee, Not a Fight, WASH. POST, May 11, 2010, at A2. 
132 See Cross-Court Shot, supra note 130. 
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Minimalist moderate. Judge McConnell has been a vocal supporter of a 
philosophy of judicial restraint, which is consistent with a Minimalist 
approach that more often defers to the judgments of district courts.133 
Although Judge McConnell has strong conservative credentials,134 he has 
found himself criticized and praised by both the right and left, belying a 
moderate ideology.135 It is unclear if his clerkship for Justice William 
Brennan is indicative of any liberal leanings,136 but his criticism of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore137 is certainly notable in 
indicating a more moderate ideology.138 Further, his nomination to the 
bench was strongly supported by liberal academics and liberal politicians 
such as Chuck Schumer who felt his intellectual honesty would make him 
less ideological on the bench.139 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit is designated as a 
Collegial moderate. Judge Wilkinson has long championed collegiality 
among judges and perhaps best embodies the label Collegial.140 Although 
some might be surprised at the “moderate” categorization, his rebuke of 
what he saw as conservative judicial activism in the Supreme Court’s 
District of Columbia v. Heller141 opinion gives strong credence to the 
designation.142 Indeed, Judge Wilkinson published a law review article 
criticizing the Supreme Court’s conservatives that illustrated the 
ideological distance in judging between Judge Wilkinson and the Supreme 
Court’s conservatives.143 
Justice (then Judge) Sotomayor is categorized as a Regulating 
moderate. Because she was a Supreme Court nominee, the public record 
concerning her judging qualities is filled with hyperbolic vitriol144 and 
 
133 David Newman & Emily Bazelon, The Supreme Court Shortlist, SLATE (July 1, 2005, 
11:34 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2005/06/the_supreme_court_
shortlist.html. 
134 Alicia Caldwell & John Aloysius Farrell, Appeals Judge Has Appeal—to Some, DENVER POST, 
June 26, 2005, at 1A; Robert Gehrke, High Court U. Scholar’s Next Stop?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 28, 
2005, at A1. 
135 Vacancy on the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A27. 
136 Brian Mitchell, Supreme Court Seat Back Up for Grabs as Miers Bows Out, INVESTOR’S BUS. 
DAILY, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1. 
137 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
138 Replacement: Who’s Next?, NAT’L J. (Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/
hotline/replacement-who-39-s-next--20051028. 
139 See supra note 134. 
140 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 
1147, 1173–74 (1994).  
141 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
142 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 
253, 274–75, 322 (2009). 
143 See id.  
144 See, e.g., Tom LoBianco, Lawyers Tag Sotomayor as “Terror on the Bench,” WASH. TIMES, 
May 29–30, 2009, at A1. 
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praise.145 Nonetheless, her background (having originally been nominated 
to the district court by President George H.W. Bush) and nonpartisan 
assessments of her record on the bench indicate moderation.146 Her 
designation as a Regulating judge befits a judge who has at least some 
reasonable partisan applications of the law that might have provided the 
basis for nominating her to the Supreme Court. 
Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt is categorized as a Steadfast liberal. Judge 
Reinhardt’s classification fits perfectly with his public reputation as an 
iconoclast liberal voice on the Ninth Circuit.147 His reputation as a liberal is 
not in doubt as notable commentators have speculated that he is the most 
liberal judge on the Ninth Circuit, which has a reputation for liberal 
decisions.148 Judge Reinhardt is regularly described as a liberal activist by 
conservative critics, which aligns with both his categorization as Steadfast 
and as a liberal.149 Indeed, the conservative Family Research Council 
awarded Judge Reinhardt its mocking Lifetime Achievement Court Jester 
Award due to his alleged liberal judicial activism.150 Judge Reinhardt also 
finds himself at the center of Ninth Circuit controversies befitting the 
lightning rod nature of a Steadfast judge.151 
Judge Sidney R. Thomas, another Ninth Circuit judge, was a relative 
unknown until some progressive groups championed him as a potential 
nominee to the Supreme Court.152 This recognition seems to be an odd fit 
with his type, Error Correcting moderate. However, many commentators 
noted that there was nothing particularly ideologically liberal in Judge 
Thomas’s record other than a couple of timely high-profile decisions that 
caught the attention of progressive advocacy groups.153 Overall, his 
reputation was of a moderate decisionmaker who built bridges between 
conservatives and liberals, which is consistent with his designation as a 
moderate.154 What little information has been published regarding his 
treatment of district court decisions indicates that he is not afraid to be 
blunt and harsh in his rulings based upon his views of the specific facts in 
 
145 Robert Barnes, Battle Lines Are Drawn on Sotomayor Nomination, WASH. POST, May 28, 2009, 
at A1. 
146 See Savage, supra note 34.  
147 David G. Savage, Did Victim’s Photo Prejudice a Jury?: Another Ruling by the Liberal-
Leaning 9th Circuit Comes Under Supreme Court Review, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at A1. 
148 See Adam Liptak, A Slow Stroll to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at A14. 
149 See Joyce Howard Price, 9th Circuit’s Rulings Frequently Overturned, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 
2002, at A16. 
150 Greg Pierce, Inside Politics: Court Jester Awards, WASH. TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A8. 
151 See Howard Mintz, Prop. 8 Appeal Panel Has Mix of Ideologies, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Nov. 30, 2010, at 1.  
152 John Schwartz, Long Shot for Court Has Reputation for Compassion and Persuasion, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A17. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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the case.155 That assessment fits well with his categorization as an Error 
Corrector. 
Overall, the categorizations represent fairly reasonable assessments of 
the notable judges based upon qualitative public impressions of them. 
There are certain designations with which some will surely disagree. 
Nonetheless, that is, in part, the value of the typology system. If the 
categories merely confirmed what was already known, it would not add as 
much to our collective understanding of decisionmaking. That the 
categorizations provide an acceptable level of agreement with qualitative 
evidence for the highest profile judges provides facial validity for the 
study. 
IV. PREDICTING JUDICIAL STYLES 
A logical question that follows from the identification of separate 
judging styles is whether any background or demographic characteristics of 
judges correlate with their styles. For example, a judge who attended a 
particular law school, served first as a district judge, or was from a certain 
circuit might exhibit different decisionmaking behavior in a statistically 
significant manner. Because the 178 judges spread across nine judicial 
styles (an average of approximately 19.9 judges per style) generated small 
population sizes, regression analyses were expected to find little or no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. And because the distribution among 
the categories was highly uneven, future research based upon larger 
populations of judges might identify more correlations. Nonetheless, 
multinomial logistic regressions demonstrated that some background traits 
are correlated with judicial styles.156 
A. Data for Background Factor Testing 
In addition to the Case Database, I constructed a separate database 
(Judge Database) that included biographical and other data about individual 
judges. In the Judge Database, judges were coded for, among other 
variables: appointing President, presidential party, age at the time of 
appointment, age in 2008, composition of the Senate at the time of 
appointment, gender, race, law school attended, prior work experience, 
whether the President and majority of the Senate were of the same party at 
the time of appointment, and whether the judge took senior status during or 
before 2008. The Judge Database included data for all federal appellate 
judges that served on panels as well as district judges who had opinions 
 
155 Id. 
156 Multinomial regression is used when an analyzed dependent variable contains multiple 
categories that are not ordered in any particular fashion (in this case, the judging styles). Logistic 
regression is used when an analyzed independent variable is categorical (e.g., circuit on which the judge 
sat). VANI K. BOROOAH, LOGIT AND PROBIT: ORDERED AND MULTINOMIAL MODELS (2002). 
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reviewed in the Case Database. In all, background trait information was 
accumulated for over 1500 federal judges. Data in the Judge Database were 
entirely human coded from publicly available information about the judges 
studied. 
B. Law School Attended 
There has been little or no empirical study of whether a judge’s or 
lawyer’s professional decisions are correlated with the law school that she 
attended. However, the data in this study show two significant correlations 
between a judge’s law school and her judicial type. First, the ranking of the 
law school attended (based upon the 2008 U.S. News and World Report 
law school rankings) is correlated with which judicial type a judge belongs 
to. Figure 13 below indicates the average law school rank for judges in 
each category. 
FIGURE 13: AVERAGE LAW SCHOOL RANKING BY JUDGE TYPE (p = 0.0369) 
 
Perhaps most interesting is that the judicial styles most strongly 
associated with contentiousness (Steadfast, Trailblazing, and Stalwart), on 
average, attended law schools that were much higher ranked (meaning they 
had a lower numerical ranking). In contrast, the types that epitomized 
collegiality (Consensus Building and Collegial) attended law schools with 
the lowest average rankings. In total, judges of the most contentious types 
(Steadfast, Stalwart, and Trailblazing) attended law schools ranked nearly 
thirty places higher than those judges associated with collaborative styles 
(Collegial and Consensus Building). Although these results do not mean 




















2008 U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1798 
Steadfast judge, the data support some connection between judicial style 
and law school attended.157 
Judicial types also correlate to whether the law school attended was 
public or private.158 Figure 14 shows the breakdown of public and private 
law school graduates among the different judicial types. 
FIGURE 14: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC LAW SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND JUDICIAL STYLE  
(p = 0.0319) 
 
A few categories stand out as having unusual distributions of private and 
public law school graduates. All five Steadfast judges attended private 
schools. Over 78% of Incrementalist judges also graduated from private 
law schools. However, Trailblazing, Regulating, and Consensus Building 
judges more often graduated from public law schools. 
Certainly, there is overlap between the correlations identified with law 
school ranking and the type of law school. For example, the average law 
school ranking for Steadfast judges was approximately fourth overall. 
Because private law schools dominate the top of the rankings, it is 
unsurprising that Steadfast judges all attended private schools. The basis 
for these correlations is unclear without further exploration, but the results 
support the proposition that where a judge attended law school is not just 
an insignificant biographical note in understanding their decisionmaking. 
 
157 p = 0.0369; pseudo R2 = 0.0243. 
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C. Appointing President’s Political Party 
Although ideology is an important component of the judicial types, 
only the absolute value of the Ideology Score was used (yielding the 
Ideological Score) to create the judicial style typology. This means that 
strong conservatives and liberals are often sorted into the same category. 
As a result, it does not necessarily follow that the party of the appointing 
President would correlate with the judicial type of the judge. Nonetheless, 
multinomial regression analysis of the data demonstrates such a 
correlation.159 Figure 15 below shows the breakdown of which appointing 
President’s party nominated the judges in each of the styles. 
FIGURE 15: JUDGE TYPE BY APPOINTING PRESIDENT’S PARTY (p = 0.0075) 
 
Certain groups, such as Steadfast judges, demonstrate an ideological 
makeup outside of the normal distribution. Steadfast judges’ ranks are 
drawn exclusively from those appointed by Democratic Presidents. In 
contrast, over 78% of Incrementalist and 80% of Trailblazing judges were 
appointed by Republican Presidents. It is difficult to know if some of these 
trends would hold with a larger population of judges, but regression does 
show a statistically significant relationship between the types and judges’ 
appointing party. Notably, perhaps due to population sizes in some 
subgroups, the specific appointing President is not correlated with the type 
of judge.160 
The domination of the Steadfast category might follow from the fact 
that appointees of Democratic Presidents are the minority in the courts of 
 
159 p = 0.0075; pseudo R2 = 0.0309. 
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appeals.161 Such judges might find themselves outside the mainstream 
perspectives embodied in existing law shaped by a Republican-dominated 
judiciary and become Steadfast against such political worldviews. 
Similarly, a majority party would necessarily contain more Incrementalists 
and Trailblazers. Because the majority party could have shaped the law in a 
worldview largely consistent with that party, many judges would not 
meddle with reshaping appellate law and instead keep the district courts 
from straying too far outside of the dominant political perspective in the 
appellate world. However, the majority party will always have some 
members who want to push the law even further in a particular ideological 
direction. These judges naturally fall within the Trailblazing category. 
D. Senior Status 
A third background trait that was correlated with the judicial 
categorization system was whether the judge had taken senior status at any 
time in or prior to 2008.162 Figure 16 below shows the distribution of judges 
who had taken senior status among the nine judicial styles. 
FIGURE 16: SENIOR STATUS AND JUDGING STYLE (p = 0.0076) 
 
Self-selection offered one possible explanation for why certain judicial 
styles were overrepresented among judges who had taken senior status. In 
order for a senior judge to appear in this study, he must have decided not to 
retire and to hear enough cases to qualify. Because senior judges can 
 
161 See infra App. C. 







































107:1757 (2013) A Typology of Judging Styles 
1801 
normally retire and receive the same pay as they would by continuing to 
work, many of those that stayed on the bench were clearly not motivated by 
financial gain.163 Further, to hear a docket equivalent in size to active status 
judges was a decision made by the individual judge. It might follow, then, 
that the three Stalwart judges were understandably all senior status judges 
who were firmly committed to strong ideological and partisan positions.164 
However, any theoretically grounded explanation for the correlation in this 
area warrants further investigation. 
E. Circuit 
The last background trait associated with judge type was the circuit on 
which the judge was appointed.165 Appendix C includes charts illustrating 
the distribution of judge types among each studied circuit. However, it is 
worth noting one prime example here. The Sixth Circuit, as illustrated in 
Figure 17 below, has been marked by a much higher level of ideological 
division than the other courts of appeals.166 
FIGURE 17: AVERAGE IDEOLOGICAL VARIANCE BY CIRCUIT (p < 0.0001) 
 
As measured by the Ideology Scores of the 178 judges in the sample, an 
average Sixth Circuit judge had an Ideology Score that was 36.1 points 
 
163 Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response 
to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 57–58 (2009).  
164 Among senior status judges, the date at which they took senior status was uncorrelated with 
judge type (p = 0.0722). 
165 p < 0.0001; pseudo R2 = 0.2338. 
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from the mean for that circuit. The next most divided circuit was the 
Eighth, with an average variation of 19.3 points. Eight of the eleven circuits 
studied had average variations less than 11 points. Needless to say, the 
Sixth Circuit was an outlier among the circuits in terms of ideological 
divide. Such statistical findings were further supported by media and 
scholarly coverage of the opinions issued from that court.167 
Based upon such sharp ideological differences, it was expected that the 
Sixth Circuit would have a disproportionate amount of the judging types 
associated with high ideology and independence. Figure 18 below includes 
a list of all of the Sixth Circuit judges in the 178-judge sample and their 
identified type (in order of judge type). 
FIGURE 18: SIXTH CIRCUIT JUDGING TYPES 
Judge Overall Type 
Eric L. Clay Trailblazing Liberal Democrat 
Danny J. Boggs Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
Richard A. Griffin Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
John M. Rogers Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
David W. McKeague Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr. Stalwart Liberal Democrat 
Jeffrey S. Sutton Regulating Moderate Republican 
Deborah L. Cook Regulating Conservative Republican 
Eugene E. Siler, Jr. Regulating Conservative Republican 
Alice M. Batchelder Regulating Conservative Republican 
Karen N. Moore Steadfast Liberal Democrat 
Ransey G. Cole, Jr. Steadfast Moderate Democrat 
Martha C. Daughtrey Steadfast Moderate Democrat 
Ronald L. Gilman Steadfast Conservative Democrat 
Julia S. Gibbons Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Boyce F. Martin, Jr. Error Correcting Liberal Democrat 
 
The Sixth Circuit had sixteen total judges with sufficient population sizes. 
Among those, there were five Trailblazing, one Stalwart, and four Steadfast 
judges. Thus, ten of the judges were of the types most prone to conflict. In 
the other ten circuits, there were only nineteen more judges of those three 
types. It is unclear if the judicial types in the Sixth Circuit are a partial 
product or cause of the ongoing situation there, but there is evidently a 
strong correlation exhibited within that Circuit. 
 
167 See, e.g., Dan Horn, 6th Circuit’s Infighting Gets Personal, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 16, 
2008, at A1.  
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CONCLUSION 
Judges are like any other group of people—they differ in their 
approaches at work, can be assessed in a multitude of ways, and do not 
perform in isolation. This study highlights the shortcomings of existing 
studies and models of judicial behavior that reject those basic ideas. The 
nine judge categories identified in this Article illustrate that our vocabulary 
and empirical understanding of judicial decisionmaking has grown 
stagnant. Instead of merely referring to and studying judges as “activist” or 
“conservative,” there is a need to recognize that such simple 
categorizations are woefully inadequate. There is strong empirical evidence 
that a complete account of judicial decisionmaking cannot rely on such 
simplistic assumptions. By limiting the scope of our inquiry and methods, 
we have missed tremendous opportunities to provide valuable quantitative 
information about some of the most important actors in our constitutional 
system. 
This Article is not intended to provide final answers to any of the basic 
questions inherent in understanding and describing judicial 
decisionmaking. Indeed, perhaps the most prominent question that follows 
from this work has not been addressed at all: how does this (or any) 
typological approach compare to other theories that have been proffered? 
Because of the enormity of and difficulty with quantitatively answering 
that query, I decided to address that issue in future work. 
Nonetheless, the proof of the concept of judicial typologies present in 
this work points to entirely new avenues for research. For example, does 
the presence of a Consensus Builder on a panel offset ideological and 
stylistic differences among copanelists to increase unanimity? Does 
changing the stylistic makeup of a circuit have a significant effect on how 
often that circuit reverses district court judgments or registers a dissent? 
Are certain judicial styles related to higher rates of a particular substantive 
outcome, such as a Steadfast judge being more apt to find for a criminal 
defendant? The typological approach described in this Article warrants a 
reimagining of empirical scholarship regarding judicial decisionmaking and 
opens lines of inquiry that were previously impossible. 
Further, the typological approach provides a data-based outsider 
perspective on the differing ways judicial decisions are reached so that, as 
Judge Richard Posner commented, we do not rely on the metaphorical cats 
(judges) to tell us about feline psychology (judicial decisionmaking of 
individual judges).168 Ultimately, the typology described herein provides 
valuable data-based information to scholars examining judicial behavior, 
politicians engaged in judicial nomination debates, and a public 
increasingly concerned about the role of judges in American society.   
 
168 POSNER, supra note 56, at 2 (“Biographies are more reliable than autobiographies, and cats are 
not consulted on the principles of feline psychology.”). 
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APPENDIX A 
Common Adjustment Methodology 
As noted in Part II.B, there were several common adjustments made to 
the raw scores to incorporate specific factors that might explain portions of 
the underlying variance measured by the scores. Four common adjustments 
were for a judge’s circuit (applied to Ideology, Activism, and Partisanship 
Scores), super-panel effects (applied to Ideology, Activism, and 
Partisanship Scores), case issue mix (applied to all four measures), and 
common scaling (applied to all four measures). 
The circuit adjustment relied on two basic premises: (1) a variety of 
differences between the circuits might explain variance in behavior and (2) 
the behavior of judges traveling between circuits would provide a means to 
calculate the amount of variance that was due to circuit differences. The 
first premise is likely noncontroversial. The adjustments made to the 
Activism and Partisanship Scores were minor because of limited 
differences in behavior observed by traveling judges. However, the second 
contention concerning senior status judges sitting on panels in different 
circuits warrants further explanation. 
There were 26 senior status judges on panels that issued opinions in 
2008. Combined, they accounted for votes on 2482 panels in the Case 
Database. Because each of those panels afforded up to three possible 
interactions with other judges (two for copanelists and one for the district 
judge), there were nearly 7500 data points derived from these judges. The 
study assumed that senior judges’ traits would remain constant in any 
circuit where they sat. So, when Judge Pasco Bowman heard cases in the 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, the study assumed he would have the same 
activism, ideology, and partisanship traits. Thus, any change in his 
behavior between the two circuits would be due to unidentified differences 
in the circuits. 
Because the distribution of the traveling votes was not evenly spread 
among the circuits, the collective scores of the 26 judges were aggregated 
and weighted according to how many votes each judge issued in a 
particular circuit. Doing that allowed an expected traveling judge value to 
be computed for each circuit using this formula169: 
Expected Ideology Score = (Judge A votes in Circuit X * Judge A Ideology 
Score + Judge B votes in Circuit X * Judge B Ideology Score + Judge C votes 
in Circuit X * Judge C Ideology Score) / (Judge A votes in Circuit X + Judge 
B votes in Circuit X + Judge C votes in Circuit X) 
The actual scores were then computed collectively (as one hypothetical 
traveling judge) for all of the traveling judges within a circuit.170 The 
 
169 Ideology is used in the example, but the principle is the same for each score. 
170 The collective treatment of traveling judges was necessary because individual judges often had 
too few votes in particular circuits. As a result, combining the scores was the only means to ensure that 
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difference between the expected and actual scores formed the basis for the 
circuit adjustment. The raw adjustment number was then divided by the 
number of traveling votes in the circuit so that the circuit differential could 
be determined on a per-vote basis. Then each judge within the circuit 
would have the circuit adjustment applied based upon the number of votes 
he or she issued.171 
Super-panel effects were the expected variance in voting caused by the 
political background of copanelists and district judges. Unlike the results in 
other panel effects studies, the integration of the district judge created new 
values that warranted different adjustments. The data suggested that the 
party of the appointing President on the super-panel affected individual 
judges’ decisions to dissent and reverse. Figures 19 and 20 below indicate 
the magnitude of those differences based upon the results from the Case 
Database. 
FIGURE 19: PANEL DISAGREEMENT RATE BY APPOINTING  




the majority of the traveling judge information was not discounted entirely. If more data were available, 
a more complex adjustment system could be utilized. 
171 Prior versions of the Ideology and Activism Scores were computed using circuit adjustments 
that were made on a per-judge basis. See Yung, Activism, supra note 17; Yung, Ideology, supra note 17. 
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FIGURE 20: REVERSAL RATE BY APPOINTING PRESIDENT’S PARTY 
OF COPANELISTS AND DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Consequently, totals were tallied for each judge based upon the six 
possible political configurations of a judge’s two copanelists and the 
district court judge being reviewed. Those potential arrangements were: 
(1) two Republican copanelists, Republican district judge (RR-R); (2) two 
Republican copanelists, Democratic district judge (RR-D); (3) one 
Republican and one Democratic copanelist, Republican district judge (RD-
R); (4) one Republican and one Democratic copanelist, Democrat district 
judge (RD-D); (5) two Democratic copanelists, Republican district judge 
(DD-R); and (6) two Democratic copanelists, Democratic district judge 
(DD-D). Based upon the data in Figures 19 and 20, it was determined how 
much variance in the judge scores could be explained by sitting on panels 
with the above six configurations. For example, if a judge sat on thirty RR-
R panels and ten DD-D panels, it was assumed that the ten DD-D panels 
would cancel out the effects of ten RR-R panels. However, the remaining 
twenty RR-R panels would pull the studied judge in a conservative 
direction and lower his reversal rate. As a result, the judge’s respective 
scores were adjusted based upon the expected magnitudes of those effects. 
The courts of appeals studied here reviewed different sets of cases 
from different sets of district judges based upon geography.172 Within each 
 
172 With the exception of the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
which were not included in this study, the remaining circuits exclusively have geographic and not 
subject-matter based jurisdiction. See Paul R. Michel, Foreword, Assuring Consistency and Uniformity 
of Precedent and Legal Doctrine in the Areas of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Entrusted Exclusively to 
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circuit, each judge was randomly assigned to hear cases, usually on panels 
of three judges. As a result, any given judge studied could have had a 
vastly different mix of issues to rule upon than the average judge. 
Consequently, an adjustment was made based on differences in judges’ 
dockets in order to decrease the degree to which any unobserved variables 
would affect the results.173 In the Case Database, one particular distinction 
in case types proved significant in both dissent and reversal rates. In 
criminal cases, judges on panels agreed 99.1% of the time and affirmed the 
judgment of the lower court in 83.2% of cases. In contrast, the panel 
disagreement rate in civil cases was 98.5% and the reversal rate was 73.3%. 
There were also intersecting differences when deferential and 
nondeferential standards of review were applied in civil and criminal cases. 
As a result, each judge’s criminal and civil cases were grouped and had 
scores calculated separately. When sample sizes for individual 
subcategories were too low (i.e., deferential standard criminal cases), then 
the scores were interpolated based upon expected and actual scores with 
that judge’s case mix. The criminal and civil scores were then weighted 
according to the distribution of the average judge. 
The last common adjustment was much simpler. Each score was 
adjusted to a similar scale. There were 178 studied judges who had at least 
200 interactions with other judges. Scaling was done so that those 178 
judges would define the extent of the scales. The Activism, Partisanship, 
and Independence Scores were scaled from 0 to 100 and the Ideology Score 
was scaled from -100 to 100. In the former case, this was done by moving 
the lowest observed raw score to the 0 and then multiplying all of the 
values by a constant needed for the highest score to reach 100. In the latter 
case (Ideology), the multiplier chosen was the value that would either move 
the highest score to 100 or lowest score to 100. There was no reason to 
force symmetry by making one judge have a score of -100 and another 100. 
  
 
173 See David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial 
Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415, 1433–34 (2005) (discussing, in the context of the Choi and 
Gulati study, the need to account for differences among circuit caseloads in creating empirical 
measures). 
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APPENDIX B  
Component Scores of Judges 
The following table includes Ideological, Activism, Partisanship, and 
Independence Scores for judges with at least 200 interactions with other 
judges. 
Judge Cir. N174 Id. Act. Part. Ind. 
Ambro, Thomas L. 3 398 4.4 70.4 42.1 48.0 
Anderson, Robert L., III 11 1007 0.4 47.0 43.1 35.4 
Anderson, Stephen H. 10 332 7.0 39.8 67.5 19.7 
Baldock, Bobby R. 10 352 5.1 44.8 45.0 53.9 
Barkett, Rosemary 11 949 2.5 56.5 45.4 41.7 
Barksdale, Rhesa H. 5 678 20.4 54.1 58.1 31.7 
Barry, Maryanne T. 3 387 0.5 73.2 25.7 31.1 
Batchelder, Alice M. 6 305 54.9 63.7 53.5 66.7 
Bauer, William J. 7 389 8.9 67.2 47.5 47.0 
Bea, Carlos T. 9 393 9.5 93.7 76.6 49.8 
Beam, Clarence A. 8 276 36.3 47.4 50.6 56.2 
Beezer, Robert R. 9 219 6.3 46.2 35.2 28.5 
Benavides, Fortunato P. 5 717 1.6 65.9 41.2 26.9 
Benton, William D. 8 659 5.5 33.7 48.5 46.8 
Berzon, Marsha S. 9 370 47.7 33.2 24.1 21.2 
Birch, Stanley F., Jr. 11 1005 9.6 36.9 45.0 36.0 
Black, Susan H. 11 1044 0.4 53.5 37.4 33.6 
Boggs, Danny J. 6 235 40.1 20.7 34.7 64.0 
Boudin, Michael 1 233 1.7 53.0 61.7 53.8 
Bowman, Pasco M., II 8 201 15.8 86.8 49.5 25.2 
Bright, Myron H. 8 217 72.9 100.0 69.1 0.0 
Briscoe, Mary B. 10 501 10.8 26.4 40.2 67.6 
Brorby, Wade 10 230 2.2 42.1 59.0 23.2 
Bybee, Jay S. 9 357 2.9 61.8 74.7 55.8 
 
174 N refers to the number of interactions the listed judge had in 2008 with other judges (district 
and appellate) in the dataset.  
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Bye, Kermit E. 8 559 3.8 56.2 43.2 46.2 
Cabranes, Jose A. 2 474 6.6 62.2 29.6 24.4 
Calabresi, Guido 2 267 14.8 34.4 51.7 26.9 
Callahan, Consuelo M. 9 372 4.3 65.2 36.7 41.9 
Canby, William C., Jr. 9 324 13.3 67.6 0.0 50.5 
Carnes, Edward E. 11 1028 2.5 55.6 48.1 34.4 
Chagares, Michael A. 3 363 8.4 55.5 66.7 36.7 
Clay, Eric L. 6 379 30.4 36.2 20.1 65.9 
Clement, Edith B. 5 693 0.0 52.5 57.9 37.2 
Clifton, Richard R. 9 306 10.3 66.9 65.3 47.1 
Cole, Ransey G., Jr. 6 419 13.0 62.4 46.8 75.7 
Colloton, Steven M. 8 591 2.6 63.3 42.6 54.9 
Cook, Deborah L. 6 266 34.5 60.2 65.2 60.7 
Cudahy, Richard D. 7 221 13.8 69.8 69.6 54.7 
Daughtrey, Martha C. 6 313 7.0 53.4 39.1 80.0 
Davis, W. Eugene 5 672 6.2 37.8 51.0 37.6 
DeMoss, Harold R., Jr. 5 267 5.1 44.5 33.6 65.3 
Dennis, James L. 5 702 0.4 48.2 44.6 46.2 
Dubina, Joel F. 11 1020 5.2 54.2 55.8 33.0 
Duncan, Allyson K. 4 633 0.4 53.7 26.4 51.4 
Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 369 9.8 50.0 57.8 43.6 
Ebel, David M. 10 381 2.9 27.1 30.3 77.3 
Edmondson, James L. 11 384 9.6 40.8 53.7 53.4 
Elrod, Jennifer W. 5 534 1.1 68.3 43.9 33.0 
Evans, Terence T. 7 483 3.3 72.6 43.8 53.1 
Fay, Peter T. 11 408 11.0 38.7 49.1 38.0 
Fernandez, Ferdinand F. 9 246 42.3 86.4 100.0 39.5 
Fisher, D. Michael 3 448 9.0 61.0 81.1 42.5 
Fisher, Raymond C. 9 426 12.5 31.1 50.6 55.9 
Flaum, Joel M. 7 480 7.3 47.0 70.7 31.5 
Fletcher, Betty B. 9 416 8.6 46.3 64.9 67.9 
Fletcher, William A. 9 323 22.8 22.6 30.9 29.7 
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Fuentes, Julio M. 3 350 7.3 73.3 39.3 32.9 
Garza, Emilio M. 5 672 16.9 43.1 34.2 39.1 
Gibbons, Julia S. 6 363 3.2 35.5 33.9 62.3 
Gibson, John R. 8 344 42.6 49.0 31.1 14.0 
Gilman, Ronald L. 6 411 23.9 77.1 45.0 79.9 
Gorsuch, Neil M. 10 430 3.9 45.6 56.2 72.3 
Gould, Ronald M. 9 395 24.8 57.7 54.0 56.7 
Graber, Susan 9 438 44.0 48.7 35.0 35.2 
Gregory, Roger L. 4 663 10.7 51.9 49.8 65.6 
Griffin, Richard A. 6 425 56.5 36.8 30.6 59.6 
Gruender, Raymond W. 8 598 46.9 41.4 50.9 32.1 
Hall, Cynthia H. 9 225 5.9 58.5 59.3 30.7 
Hall, Peter W. 2 451 9.5 36.1 28.3 20.9 
Hamilton, Clyde H. 4 495 0.3 70.5 46.2 46.7 
Hansen, David R. 8 213 6.6 33.0 28.8 61.7 
Hardiman, Thomas M. 3 359 22.6 61.6 65.2 33.2 
Hartz, Harris L. 10 454 11.6 23.2 36.5 69.2 
Hawkins, Michael D. 9 369 22.1 42.9 49.7 31.4 
Haynes, Catharina 5 339 2.8 46.2 17.6 35.4 
Higginbotham, Patrick E. 5 615 4.1 55.0 36.6 32.0 
Holmes, Jerome A. 10 453 6.7 38.9 35.4 32.3 
Howard, Jeffrey R. 1 340 1.2 64.6 76.5 46.2 
Hull, Frank M. 11 1053 0.5 45.5 38.3 30.3 
Ikuta, Sandra S. 9 350 28.9 53.7 60.7 44.0 
Jacobs, Dennis G. 2 336 6.3 53.0 39.5 43.5 
Jolly, E. Grady 5 689 10.4 47.6 35.1 43.5 
Jones, Edith H. 5 437 15.6 51.0 21.3 51.5 
Jordan, Kent A. 3 432 2.2 47.4 60.1 52.1 
Kanne, Michael S. 7 420 4.0 48.3 51.4 41.5 
Katzmann, Robert A. 2 354 4.7 52.9 28.0 36.9 
Kelly, Paul J., Jr. 10 492 4.8 58.2 58.7 59.9 
King, Carolyn D. 5 737 4.8 43.3 45.7 47.0 
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King, Robert B. 4 699 2.5 54.9 37.6 36.2 
Kleinfeld, Andrew J. 9 285 25.9 65.2 69.6 15.5 
Kravitch, Phyllis A. 11 384 6.3 36.5 47.9 37.5 
Leavy, Edward 9 264 3.7 64.0 41.3 32.2 
Lipez, Kermit V. 1 300 2.5 78.7 20.4 51.0 
Livingston, Debra A. 2 419 6.7 52.3 46.2 34.0 
Loken, James B. 8 360 0.4 48.3 45.8 58.6 
Lucero, Carlos F. 10 444 8.0 21.7 40.1 60.2 
Lynch, Sandra L. 1 353 14.8 60.3 18.2 51.7 
Manion, Daniel A. 7 444 4.4 46.4 41.5 56.6 
Marcus, Stanley 11 1026 8.7 41.2 46.5 29.2 
Martin, Boyce F., Jr. 6 334 24.3 75.2 13.0 37.7 
McConnell, Michael W. 10 442 3.2 29.4 45.1 58.5 
McKay, Monroe G. 10 322 6.0 39.1 1.8 36.6 
McKeague, David W. 6 383 72.3 36.3 53.4 52.2 
McKee, Theodore A. 3 331 10.4 71.0 38.9 40.9 
McKeown, M. Margaret 9 359 11.6 21.6 40.4 45.2 
Melloy, Michael J. 8 445 16.1 73.2 57.7 49.4 
Merritt, Gilbert S., Jr. 6 212 100.0 78.6 45.5 61.4 
Michael, M. Blane 4 650 36.0 49.9 44.6 25.0 
Miner, Roger J. 2 219 11.5 73.5 45.4 28.6 
Moore, Karen N. 6 433 28.1 66.0 31.5 100.0 
Motz, Diana G. 4 570 3.0 60.0 48.2 42.8 
Murphy, Diana E. 8 653 19.9 55.4 49.1 42.5 
Murphy, Michael R. 10 467 9.6 56.6 14.2 56.9 
Nelson, Thomas G. 9 249 9.0 37.7 70.6 54.1 
Niemeyer, Paul V. 4 675 21.4 44.9 43.4 36.6 
O’Brien, Terrence L. 10 338 46.5 28.5 40.0 20.9 
O’Scannlain, Diarmuid F. 9 393 45.2 38.2 55.1 33.4 
Owen, Priscilla R. 5 668 3.1 35.8 45.9 42.3 
Paez, Richard A. 9 392 21.3 70.0 46.8 51.2 
Parker, Barrington D., Jr. 2 382 3.7 33.4 30.1 34.2 
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Pooler, Rosemary S. 2 363 17.6 47.9 45.2 22.5 
Posner, Richard A. 7 380 18.7 49.0 44.9 36.4 
Prado, Edward C. 5 738 2.3 48.9 44.4 30.2 
Pregerson, Harry 9 260 16.7 86.1 11.6 49.4 
Pryor, William H., Jr. 11 992 4.6 53.2 47.3 36.3 
Raggi, Reena 2 444 2.1 34.9 46.4 30.8 
Rawlinson, Johnnie B. 9 281 5.0 81.4 77.6 84.5 
Reavley, Thomas M. 5 512 3.5 42.9 28.2 54.9 
Reinhardt, Stephen R. 9 239 20.4 61.2 24.6 72.4 
Rendell, Marjorie O. 3 324 13.6 88.8 42.0 61.0 
Riley, William J. 8 579 41.8 37.7 28.9 5.1 
Ripple, Kenneth F. 7 416 3.6 55.3 55.6 52.8 
Rogers, John M. 6 370 67.6 35.5 47.1 65.1 
Roth, Jane R. 3 393 4.9 39.0 52.8 37.0 
Rovner, Ilana D. 7 429 6.6 57.9 46.2 51.9 
Rymer, Pamela A. 9 312 26.9 82.2 35.3 56.0 
Sack, Robert D. 2 377 2.9 32.1 56.1 29.0 
Schroeder, Mary M. 9 315 10.2 55.7 61.1 51.0 
Scirica, Anthony J. 3 293 2.0 57.0 31.6 46.2 
Selya, Bruce M. 1 254 9.5 71.7 63.0 52.2 
Shedd, Dennis W. 4 633 2.9 49.6 42.8 51.1 
Shepherd, Bobby E. 8 605 5.5 49.0 36.5 55.5 
Siler, Eugene E., Jr. 6 358 39.6 59.3 56.8 64.2 
Silverman, Barry G. 9 354 15.7 52.6 29.3 24.0 
Sloviter, Dolores K. 3 354 4.3 66.6 36.7 51.0 
Smith, David B. 3 358 19.8 52.4 29.3 29.1 
Smith, Jerry E. 5 684 6.6 45.8 26.5 50.8 
Smith, Lavenski R. 8 618 1.1 74.4 60.2 27.6 
Smith, Milan D., Jr. 9 345 26.3 53.9 45.5 26.5 
Smith, Norman R. 9 330 7.5 45.7 55.5 42.3 
Sotomayor, Sonia 2 360 17.3 39.3 57.2 48.1 
Southwick, Leslie 5 660 1.6 30.7 45.3 39.1 
107:1757 (2013) A Typology of Judging Styles 
1813 
Stewart, Carl E. 5 764 7.6 36.1 36.8 38.0 
Straub, Chester J. 2 296 8.7 18.6 32.3 32.2 
Sutton, Jeffrey S. 6 305 1.8 60.4 67.8 65.1 
Sykes, Diane S. 7 389 17.4 23.5 35.2 46.6 
Tacha, Deanell R. 10 388 22.4 24.8 50.9 41.8 
Tallman, Richard C. 9 279 33.0 63.2 12.6 27.2 
Tashima, A. Wallace 9 435 5.9 79.9 23.2 44.5 
Thomas, Sidney R. 9 536 2.9 61.7 32.4 57.0 
Tinder, John D. 7 263 8.2 14.1 44.7 27.5 
Tjoflat, Gerald B. 11 885 23.5 54.8 30.0 23.6 
Torruella, Juan R. 1 345 22.2 46.5 43.2 47.4 
Traxler, William B., Jr. 4 714 9.3 57.9 46.1 36.3 
Trott, Stephen S. 9 204 9.7 12.0 55.7 44.5 
Tymkovich, Timothy M. 10 531 9.3 49.0 47.5 51.1 
Walker, John M., Jr. 2 211 13.0 0.0 40.4 37.9 
Wallace, J. Clifford 9 291 8.7 39.1 51.2 50.4 
Wardlaw, Kim M. 9 378 17.5 36.8 71.8 46.2 
Wesley, Richard C. 2 427 6.8 42.4 33.1 33.8 
Wiener, Jacques L., Jr. 5 738 13.5 36.5 43.5 35.0 
Wilkins, William W. 4 279 8.3 85.8 25.0 21.8 
Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III 4 617 7.0 49.8 37.5 39.0 
Williams, Ann C. 7 384 12.5 60.8 35.2 38.5 
Williams, Karen J. 4 221 26.9 46.4 79.3 59.3 
Wilson, Charles R. 11 1111 0.7 49.0 47.1 40.7 
Wollman, Roger L. 8 692 13.7 48.8 38.2 42.8 
Wood, Diane P. 7 420 28.0 48.9 53.5 26.5 
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APPENDIX C  
Types for All Studied Judges 
The following table includes judicial types exhibited in the period and 
cases studied for judges with at least 200 interactions with other judges. For 
the type, the political party listed is based upon the political party of the 
nominating President. 
Judge Cir. N175 Judging Style Type 
Ambro, Thomas L. 3 398 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Anderson, Robert L., III 11 1007 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Anderson, Stephen H. 10 332 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Baldock, Bobby R. 10 352 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Barkett, Rosemary 11 949 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Barksdale, Rhesa H. 5 678 Incrementalist Conservative Republican 
Barry, Maryanne T. 3 387 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Batchelder, Alice M. 6 305 Regulating Conservative Republican 
Bauer, William J. 7 389 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Bea, Carlos T. 9 393 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Beam, Clarence A. 8 276 Regulating Conservative Republican 
Beezer, Robert R. 9 219 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Benavides, Fortunato P. 5 717 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Benton, William D. 8 659 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Berzon, Marsha S. 9 370 Consensus Building Liberal Democrat 
Birch, Stanley F., Jr. 11 1005 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Black, Susan H. 11 1044 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Boggs, Danny J. 6 235 Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
Boudin, Michael 1 233 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Bowman, Pasco M., II 8 201 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Bright, Myron H. 8 217 Stalwart Liberal Democrat 
Briscoe, Mary B. 10 501 Minimalist Moderate Democrat 
Brorby, Wade 10 230 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Bybee, Jay S. 9 357 Regulating Moderate Republican 
 
175 N refers to the number of interactions the listed judge had with other judges (district and 
appellate) in the dataset. 
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Bye, Kermit E. 8 559 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Cabranes, Jose A. 2 474 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Calabresi, Guido 2 267 Incrementalist Moderate Democrat 
Callahan, Consuelo M. 9 372 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Canby, William C., Jr. 9 324 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Carnes, Edward E. 11 1028 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Chagares, Michael A. 3 363 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Clay, Eric L. 6 379 Trailblazing Liberal Democrat 
Clement, Edith B. 5 693 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Clifton, Richard R. 9 306 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Cole, Ransey G., Jr. 6 419 Steadfast Moderate Democrat 
Colloton, Steven M. 8 591 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Cook, Deborah L. 6 266 Regulating Conservative Republican 
Cudahy, Richard D. 7 221 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Daughtrey, Martha C. 6 313 Steadfast Moderate Democrat 
Davis, W. Eugene 5 672 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
DeMoss, Harold R., Jr. 5 267 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Dennis, James L. 5 702 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Dubina, Joel F. 11 1020 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Duncan, Allyson K. 4 633 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 369 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Ebel, David M. 10 381 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Edmondson, James L. 11 384 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Elrod, Jennifer W. 5 534 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Evans, Terence T. 7 483 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Fay, Peter T. 11 408 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Fernandez, Ferdinand F. 9 246 Stalwart Conservative Republican 
Fisher, D. Michael 3 448 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Fisher, Raymond C. 9 426 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Flaum, Joel M. 7 480 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Fletcher, Betty B. 9 416 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Fletcher, William A. 9 323 Minimalist Liberal Democrat 
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Fuentes, Julio M. 3 350 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Garza, Emilio M. 5 672 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Gibbons, Julia S. 6 363 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Gibson, John R. 8 344 Consensus Building Conservative 
Republican 
Gilman, Ronald L. 6 411 Steadfast Conservative Democrat 
Gorsuch, Neil M. 10 430 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Gould, Ronald M. 9 395 Regulating Liberal Democrat 
Graber, Susan 9 438 Consensus Building Liberal Democrat 
Gregory, Roger L. 4 663 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Griffin, Richard A. 6 425 Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
Gruender, Raymond W. 8 598 Consensus Building Conservative 
Republican 
Hall, Cynthia H. 9 225 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Hall, Peter W. 2 451 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Hamilton, Clyde H. 4 495 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Hansen, David R. 8 213 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Hardiman, Thomas M. 3 359 Incrementalist Conservative Republican 
Hartz, Harris L. 10 454 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Hawkins, Michael D. 9 369 Incrementalist Liberal Democrat 
Haynes, Catharina 5 339 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Higginbotham, Patrick E. 5 615 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Holmes, Jerome A. 10 453 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Howard, Jeffrey R. 1 340 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Hull, Frank M. 11 1053 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Ikuta, Sandra S. 9 350 Regulating Conservative Republican 
Jacobs, Dennis G. 2 336 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Jolly, E. Grady 5 689 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Jones, Edith H. 5 437 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Jordan, Kent A. 3 432 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Kanne, Michael S. 7 420 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Katzmann, Robert A. 2 354 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Kelly, Paul J., Jr. 10 492 Regulating Moderate Republican 
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King, Carolyn D. 5 737 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
King, Robert B. 4 699 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Kleinfeld, Andrew J. 9 285 Incrementalist Conservative Republican 
Kravitch, Phyllis A. 11 384 Incrementalist Moderate Democrat 
Leavy, Edward 9 264 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Lipez, Kermit V. 1 300 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Livingston, Debra A. 2 419 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Loken, James B. 8 360 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Lucero, Carlos F. 10 444 Minimalist Moderate Democrat 
Lynch, Sandra L. 1 353 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Manion, Daniel A. 7 444 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Marcus, Stanley 11 1026 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Martin, Boyce F., Jr. 6 334 Error Correcting Liberal Democrat 
McConnell, Michael W. 10 442 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
McKay, Monroe G. 10 322 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
McKeague, David W. 6 383 Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
McKee, Theodore A. 3 331 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
McKeown, M. Margaret 9 359 Minimalist Moderate Democrat 
Melloy, Michael J. 8 445 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Merritt, Gilbert S., Jr. 6 212 Stalwart Liberal Democrat 
Michael, M. Blane 4 650 Incrementalist Liberal Democrat 
Miner, Roger J. 2 219 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Moore, Karen N. 6 433 Steadfast Liberal Democrat 
Motz, Diana G. 4 570 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Murphy, Diana E. 8 653 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Murphy, Michael R. 10 467 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Nelson, Thomas G. 9 249 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Niemeyer, Paul V. 4 675 Incrementalist Conservative Republican 
O’Brien, Terrence L. 10 338 Consensus Building Conservative 
Republican 
O’Scannlain, Diarmuid F. 9 393 Consensus Building Conservative 
Republican 
Owen, Priscilla R. 5 668 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
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Paez, Richard A. 9 392 Regulating Liberal Democrat 
Parker, Barrington D., Jr. 2 382 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Pooler, Rosemary S. 2 363 Incrementalist Moderate Democrat 
Posner, Richard A. 7 380 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Prado, Edward C. 5 738 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Pregerson, Harry 9 260 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Pryor, William H., Jr. 11 992 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Raggi, Reena 2 444 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Rawlinson, Johnnie B. 9 281 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Reavley, Thomas M. 5 512 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Reinhardt, Stephen R. 9 239 Steadfast Liberal Democrat 
Rendell, Marjorie O. 3 324 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Riley, William J. 8 579 Consensus Building Conservative 
Republican 
Ripple, Kenneth F. 7 416 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Rogers, John M. 6 370 Trailblazing Conservative Republican 
Roth, Jane R. 3 393 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Rovner, Ilana D. 7 429 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Rymer, Pamela A. 9 312 Error Correcting Conservative 
Republican 
Sack, Robert D. 2 377 Incrementalist Moderate Democrat 
Schroeder, Mary M. 9 315 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Scirica, Anthony J. 3 293 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Selya, Bruce M. 1 254 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Shedd, Dennis W. 4 633 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Shepherd, Bobby E. 8 605 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Siler, Eugene E., Jr. 6 358 Regulating Conservative Republican 
Silverman, Barry G. 9 354 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Sloviter, Dolores K. 3 354 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Smith, David B. 3 358 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Smith, Jerry E. 5 684 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Smith, Lavenski R. 8 618 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Smith, Milan D., Jr. 9 345 Incrementalist Liberal Republican 
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Smith, Norman R. 9 330 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Sotomayor, Sonia 2 360 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Southwick, Leslie 5 660 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Stewart, Carl E. 5 764 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Straub, Chester J. 2 296 Minimalist Moderate Democrat 
Sutton, Jeffrey S. 6 305 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Sykes, Diane S. 7 389 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Tacha, Deanell R. 10 388 Minimalist Conservative Republican 
Tallman, Richard C. 9 279 Collegial Conservative Democrat176 
Tashima, A. Wallace 9 435 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Thomas, Sidney R. 9 536 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Tinder, John D. 7 263 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Tjoflat, Gerald B. 11 885 Collegial Conservative Republican 
Torruella, Juan R. 1 345 Regulating Liberal Republican 
Traxler, William B., Jr. 4 714 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Trott, Stephen S. 9 204 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Tymkovich, Timothy M. 10 531 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Walker, John M., Jr. 2 211 Minimalist Moderate Republican 
Wallace, J. Clifford 9 291 Regulating Moderate Republican 
Wardlaw, Kim M. 9 378 Regulating Moderate Democrat 
Wesley, Richard C. 2 427 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Wiener, Jacques L., Jr. 5 738 Incrementalist Moderate Republican 
Wilkins, William W. 4 279 Error Correcting Moderate Republican 
Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III 4 617 Collegial Moderate Republican 
Williams, Ann C. 7 384 Error Correcting Moderate Democrat 
Williams, Karen J. 4 221 Regulating Conservative Republican 
Wilson, Charles R. 11 1111 Collegial Moderate Democrat 
Wollman, Roger L. 8 692 Collegial Moderate Republican 
 
176 Judge Tallman was actually known as a Republican when appointed by President Clinton. 
Henry Weinstein, The Recall Campaign; Court to Reconsider Delay of Recall Vote, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2003, at A1. His nomination was part of a package of judges brokered between key Senators in 
order to get several Democratic judges confirmed. Nonetheless, for consistency in application of the 
terminology, he is referred to as a “Democrat” in the table. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1820 
Wood, Diane P. 7 420 Incrementalist Liberal Democrat 
 
 
